A non-partisan consortium of public and private universities and other research organizations, the White House Transition Project focuses on smoothing the transition of power in the American Presidency. Its “Reports” series applies scholarship to specific problems identified by those who have borne the responsibilities for governing. Its “Briefing” series uses extensive interviews with practitioners from the past seven White Houses to produce institutional memories for most of the primary offices in the West Wing operation of the presidency.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR AND STAFF

Transition Challenges

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The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (as the job has been officially titled since the early 1970’s, but informally termed “NSC advisor”) and the staff that serves under that person is one of the most important White House offices in its impact on policy. In some administrations, that impact is so strong that foreign and national security policy making is essentially centralized in the hands of the NSC advisor with minimal input from cabinet-level departments such as State or Defense. Few today—or even back then—could identify President Richard M. Nixon’s first secretary of state even though he had been Dwight D. Eisenhower’s second attorney general (William Rogers, by the way). Yet Nixon’s NSC advisor, Henry Kissinger, was a household name and a recognizable media figure. Indeed such was the power of the position, that when Nixon eventually appointed Kissinger as secretary of state in 1973, he retained his job as NSC advisor.2 In other administrations, NSC advisor and departmental input in the policy process were more balanced. Such was the case, for example, during Gen. Brent Scowcroft’s tenure in the job under President George H.W. Bush. In still other administrations, the policy roles of the NSC advisor and staff have been more attenuated. The latter has been rarer since the 1960’s. But there have been cases, such as during Alexander Haig’s tenure as secretary of state, where departmental dominance was asserted, although in Haig’s case not successfully or for very long.

As with many of the units and offices within the White House staff, there is little statutory or legal constraint (beyond budgetary limits) in how the role of NSC advisor is defined or how the NSC staff is organized and operates. Much is the result of tradition, presidential inclination, and the personalities, prior experiences, and interpersonal dynamics among the “principals”—the president’s key advisers, the NSC advisor included. Indeed matters are so fluid that there is no common agreement whether the informal title is NSC “adviser” or “advisor” (I will follow the preference of recent administrations and use the latter).3

For presidential transitions, the role of NSC advisor and the organization of the NSC staff must clearly be of special attention and concern. Not only have they become the president’s most important source of policy advice on foreign and national security policy, the NSC advisor-designate almost always plays a major role in how national security policy making will be organized and in filling NSC staff positions. Plus, in the short run of a new presidency’s early—and critical—days and months, they are readily available sources of information and counsel: they are non-confirmable positions that can be more quickly filled than is the case for the sub-cabinet.

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2 Kissinger eventually relinquished the NSC advisor post on November 3, 1975, during the Ford presidency, and was replaced by his deputy, Gen. Brent Scowcroft.

I. **HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT**

The evolution of the role of the NSC advisor and staff has been significant. Their precise time of origin as key players in the process, particularly the NSC advisor, is subject to some debate. But the history is instructive.

**FOUNDATION: THE TRUMAN YEARS**

At least organizationally, a plausible case can be made tracing at least some impact back to the National Security Act of 1947, which first statutorily established the National Security Council as an advisory body to the president. As part of the act, the position of NSC “executive secretary” and an NSC staff were created to facilitate the Council in its work. The White House successfully maneuvered to place both under direct presidential control rather than lodging them in the Pentagon, as then Navy Secretary and later first Defense Secretary James Forrestal had strenuously lobbied in favor of.

Yet the Truman national security system was a weak one. Truman distrusted the collective deliberative apparatus thrust upon him by the Republican-controlled 80th Congress. Until the Korean War broke out in June 1950, he attended only twelve of fifty-seven NSC meetings. During the war, the NSC met every Thursday, and Truman attended sixty four of its remaining seventy-one meetings. As for the NSC staff, it was a presidential instrument from the start, although not a very strong one. Truman’s choice as its first executive secretary—Rear Admiral Sidney Souers—was a pale imitation, if that, of even the weaker NSC advisors in subsequent administrations. Most accounts of the history of the NSC and its staff mention Souers and his successor under Truman, James S. Lay Jr., but they are rarely included in lists of “NSC advisors.” At most they served as

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4. In the original 1947 act, the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the three service-branch secretaries (Navy, Army, and Air Force), and the chair of the National Security Resources Board were designated statutory members of the NSC. Late in the drafting of the 1947 act, the president was also given the power to designate additional members of the NSC when he felt necessary (although the act stated that they were only eligible for inclusion if they held an office confirmed by the Senate); by 1949, the treasury secretary was regularly attending NSC meetings. In the 1949 reorganization of the NSC (which had as its impetus recommendations by the first Hoover Commission), the three service secretaries were removed as statutory members—they strengthening the position of the defense secretary—and the vice president was added. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the CIA were also designated as statutory advisers to the NSC; at least in theory that change gave the JCS Chair a bit of freedom to disagree with the defense secretary. The NSC executive secretary and staff were also formally incorporated as part of the Executive Office of the President, thus further securing presidential control of the national security process. In 1951, The Mutual Security Act made the director of mutual security a statutory member of the NSC. Truman’s initial appointee was Averill Harriman. In 1953, the National Security Resources Board was abolished and replaced by the Office of Defense Mobilization, whose chair was made a statutory member of the council. In addition, the director of the Foreign Operations Administration was made a member of the council; however, later the Foreign Operations Administration was reorganized as the International Cooperation Administration, the director of which was not made a statutory member. Currently, according the NSC’s White House website, “The National Security Council is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate” (National Security Council, “History of the National Security Council”).

5. Truman further curbed Forrestal’s efforts at control by having the secretary of state rather than defense preside over NSC meetings in his absence.


somewhat limited policy coordinators and staff facilitators, not sources of substantive policy advice much less embodying other aspects of the modern NSC advisor’s role. Yet they were steadfast in maintaining presidential control over the NSC; it would serve at most in an advisory but not constraining capacity for the president.

There were organizational weaknesses. The NSC staff was small and largely drawn from departmental detailees. Initial position papers for Council discussion were prepared by State or Defense, not by an independent NSC staff. As well, the working groups established to consider these papers—before they rose to the full NSC—were drawn from the affected departments.

In the view of James Lay, the staff members detailed from departments to work for the NSC “tended to become or be looked upon as foreigners to their respective departments.” But at the same time, the “consultants” from the departments who directly reviewed policy papers with the NSC’s executive secretary “looked upon their passive role as secondary to their heavy departmental responsibilities, [and] gave less and less attention to NSC affairs.” Interagency coordinating and vetting, at a higher level but below the full meetings of the NSC, were non-existent.

The final product—staff reports to the NSC—“were too frequently unacceptable when they reached the Council table. It was difficult for the staff to exercise initiative in developing forward-looking policies.” As a result, Lay notes, “more and more, individual departments preferred to send their draft recommendations directly to the Council without any staff coordination, with inevitable clashes and delays at the Council table.” According to the history of the NSC on the White House Web site, the planning process prior to NSC meetings “suffered from haphazard staffing and irregular meetings and was sometimes bypassed entirely. The executive secretaries of the Council had no real authority or influence beyond managing the process.”

**ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: THE EISENHOWER YEARS**

Not surprisingly, change came quickly in the organizationally attentive Eisenhower presidency. Eisenhower’s agent for reform was Boston banker Robert Cutler. During the 1952 transition, Eisenhower and Cutler met to discuss needed improvements. By late March, following extensive consultation with former Truman-era officials and others inside and outside of government, Cutler presented to Eisenhower the architecture of a new national security process, which, with some tinkering, the president approved.

One major change was the appointment of a new White House official—Cutler himself—as the major domo of the process, above the executive secretary level. Eisenhower informed Cutler that he had decided on a new title for his position—several had been discussed—“Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.” Cutler’s first presidential charge was to put his report into action.

The other organizational changes closely tracked with correcting the deficiencies of the Truman years. The most noticeable feature of the new system was the creation of what came to be dubbed “policy hill.” Its organizational topography included a more regular, better organized, and higher level planning operation before matters were considered at full Council meetings: the NSC Planning

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8. On the early organization of the staff, see Sidney W. Souers, “Policy Formulation for National Security,” American Political Science Review, 43 (3, 1949): 537-38; and James S. Lay Jr., “National Security Council’s Role in the U.S. Security and Peace Program,” World Affairs 115 (2, 1952): 37-39. In 1949, the NSC staff budget was $200,000 with a full staff of 31 (including clerical), half of whom according to Souers were on detail from other departments (Souers, “Policy Formulation for National Security,” 538).


12. Cutler, the president of Boston’s Old Colony Trust Company, was a reserve brigadier general who had served on Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s staff and had briefly been on the Truman NSC Psychological Strategy Board.
Board. As the “upside” of policy hill, main task of this interagency group was not only to find areas of consensus and policy agreement but also to ensure that policy alternatives, where agreement could not be obtained beforehand, were placed before the full NSC. Meeting weekly, it especially took care to make sure that departmental points of disagreement—so-called “policy splits”—were clearly brought to the attention of the NSC’s members. With Cutler as chair, the Planning Board began to set the foundation of the modern NSC advisor’s role.

With respect to the NSC staff, Cutler retained Lay as executive secretary and S. Everett Gleason as Lay’s deputy. In Cutler’s view their institutional memory from the Truman years would be helpful. They are “devoted, capable, and well-informed,” he told Eisenhower, “They will provide continuity, effectively operate the staff mechanism, and greatly help in the policy planning.” It is an important lesson in the importance of the continuity of expertise and substantive knowledge in the transition from one administration to the next.

At the “top” of policy hill were regular meetings of the NSC (generally weekly, on Thursday mornings—usually two hours in length but sometimes reaching four—with Eisenhower in attendance) and the creation of written “records of action” reflecting NSC deliberations and presidential decisions. Cutler and his successors would play a role: not in tendering personal advice but in fairly presenting the view of others and in keeping the discussion on track.

What would come to be the “down slope” of policy hill—the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB)—was not the product of Cutler’s direct handiwork, but the result of another board, the Jackson Committee (of which Cutler was a member). Chaired by William H. Jackson (a businessman and former CIA official who would also serve as acting NSC special assistant in the latter months of 1956) its purpose (much like Cutler’s) was to examine and improve on the policy mechanisms of the Truman years, in this case the Psychological Strategy Board. In September 1953, the committee recommended that a new OCB would have as part of its duties the development of psychological strategy aimed at Cold War propaganda. But it was given a broader mandate: it would monitor and coordinate policy implementation by agencies and departments. The new OCB was chaired (until

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14. Cutler’s recommendations also included Eisenhower’s desire that the secretary of the treasury and the director of the Bureau of the Budget be made non-statutory members of the NSC so that the fiscal and economic impact of national security decisions would be properly factored in. Fiscal concerns also figured in another recommendation adopted: the requirement of financial appendixes to Planning Board policy options that were up for discussion by the full NSC; see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963, 131-32. The Director of the U.S. Information Agency was also added as a non-statutory member of the NSC. Additional ad hoc members of the NSC were added as needed, such as the attorney general when matters of constitutional or legal import arose (Robert Cutler, No Time for Rest, Boston: Little, Brown 1965, 299; also see Herbert Brownell with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993, 291-93). With respect to the “records of action,” these were prepared generally by the Friday after the Thursday NSC meeting, or by Monday or Tuesday of the next week at the latest. According to Gordon Gray (Eisenhower’s last NSC adviser), they also offered the opportunity for “reclammas,” which were put forward from time to time by departments that might object to something in the record (Gordon Gray Oral History, June 25, 1975, Eisenhower Library, 18).

15. On the Wm. Jackson Committee and its work, see Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 93-95. As Bowie and Immerman note, the OCB was the weaker part of the Eisenhower national security system: “Over the subsequent months and years the administration continually tinkered with the OCB’s organization and functions; still, its performance never met the president’s expectations. But the OCB’s important contribution to America’s national security was never questioned, and Eisenhower and his advisers viewed his successor’s decision to dismantle it as a grave mistake” (Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 95). On problems with the Truman-era PSB and the subsequent development of the OCB also see Elmer Staats Oral History, July 13, 1964, Kennedy Library, 8-10.

16. In his earlier consultations with Cutler, General George C. Marshall was especially instructive about the importance of later stages of the policy process when he “spoke at length about the need for policy coordination. Policy is 10% planning and 90% carrying into effect. Some one must keep constant watch to see that policies are being carried out (a
January 1960) by the under secretary of state (initially Eisenhower’s war-time chief of staff, Gen. Walter Bedell Smith) and its members consisted of representatives from other agencies and departments (here much like the Planning Board) as well as Cutler from the NSC.¹⁷

Creation of the Planning Board, while important, was not the only alteration in process. Effective day-to-day operations, as much as good organization and structure for policy planning, were objects of Cutler’s scrutiny and remedy. Much would lay the foundation for the NSC advisor as an “honest broker” of the deliberative process—and it was the leitmotif of Cutler’s understanding of the job. Cutler’s early recommendations for reform included a strong charge—indeed “an unbreakable engagement” in his words—that NSC principals be briefed by their Planning Board representatives before Council meetings. Cutler also stressed that every Planning Board participant “must express and stand by his honest views; those views, if substantial conflicts cannot be fairly resolved, may never be suppressed or compromised, but should be reported to the Council.”¹⁸

Indeed, the report clearly states that each Planning Board member “has the right to have included in any report sent up to the Council, in his own words, any disagreement on the part of his department or agency with any part of such report.”¹⁹ Here we see the importance of the NSC advisor as a fair and honest broker of the policy process.

Other changes made included better circulation of policy papers before NSC meetings, clear agendas (set by Cutler and his staff), and regular briefings of Eisenhower by Cutler of agenda matters on the afternoon before NSC meetings. Cutler also included in his recommendations a clear list of his own duties as NSC special assistant/advisor. Some reflected elements of brokerage: oversight of the deliberative process and power to remedy any deficiencies. Cutler had “responsibility for the rate of flow of work through the Planning Board, and the manner of presentation and quality of such work.” Cutler presided at Planning Board meetings, but he saw as his special duty—and here we explicitly see direct brokerage—to “lead the discussion in such manner as to bring out the most active participation by all present.” It also was Cutler’s duty to bring “to the attention of the president with recommendations for appropriate action, [and any] lack of progress of an agency in carrying out a particular policy which has been assigned to it.”²⁰ Cutler’s role as honest broker was not restricted to organizational matters: brokerage also occurred in NSC meetings. As Fred I. Greenstein and Richard Immerman summarize, “The assistant for national security affairs played an active, but largely procedural part in the deliberations. He kept the debate on track, directed the council’s attention to disagreements and ambiguities, and watched for signs of policy slippage.”²¹

The formal organization of the Eisenhower NSC process was not without its critics, particularly the Senate subcommittee investigation led by Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA) toward the

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¹⁷. In January 1960, NSC advisor Gordon Gray took over the chairmanship of the OCB. In 1957, during Cutler’s second stint as NSC advisor, the OCB was formally brought within the EOP and Cutler was made its vice-chair. Cutler was not comfortable in that capacity and persuaded Eisenhower to appoint a second special assistant on the NSC staff (Frederick Dearborn) to take on that task.


close of the administration. The charge was that it was bureaucratically cumbersome, slow in its deliberative operations, and prone to compromise and “lowest common denominator” policy recommendations.

Even today, when there is greater appreciation of the inner workings of the Eisenhower presidency and of Eisenhower’s leadership style, the debate continues. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. asked as late as 2000, “Is the layered Eisenhower machinery really ‘a precedent for effective national security advising? On the record, surely not. It is wrong too in theory. Organization charts are less important than people.” Moreover, according to Schlesinger, the Eisenhower model “is all the more wrong” with the onset of the digital age: “the vertical arrangements of the past are being replaced by increasingly horizontal arrangements—which is the way that presidents like FDR and JFK operated instinctively.”

By contrast, in the view of Laurin Henry, the author of an extensive early study of presidential transitions, “The Planning Board, the NSC, and the OCB constituted an architectonic system for policy formulation, decision, and execution of which the administration was extremely proud.” Subsequent empirical studies of decision making during the Eisenhower years bear out the merits its national security deliberative arrangements, as noted below.

**THE McGEORGE BUNDY YEARS: CHANGE, BUT FOR THE BETTER?**

In the post-Eisenhower years, the job of NSC advisor evolved considerably. Eisenhower saw the NSC system and its staff as a device for effectively harnessing the relevant agencies and departments so that they would have productive input on policy options. For his immediate successor, however, that system was too ossified and bureaucratic. For John F. Kennedy, the NSC advisor and staff needed to be more forcefully a presidential instrument, one serving as a direct source for presidential initiatives. Subsequent presidencies have grappled with these two organizationally different models and the different implications they bear for the role of the NSC advisor and staff.

McGeorge Bundy’s tenure as NSC advisor is illustrative of some of the dilemmas. Both Kennedy and Bundy found the organizational structure of the Eisenhower policy process cumbersome and overly bureaucratic. Both the Planning Board and the OCB were quickly abolished. Kennedy, an instinctively informal as well highly collegial decision maker, also preferred venues other than the organized and somewhat large NSC meetings of the Eisenhower years. According to Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s chief White House adviser, NSC meetings were used—when they were used—for “minor decisions” or “major ones actually settled earlier.” Kennedy “strongly preferred to make all major decisions with far fewer people present.” During and after crises, the NSC would often be convened, but for the purpose of getting everyone on record and to “silence outside critics.”

As Kennedy himself observed in a NBC television interview in April 1961,

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meetings of the NSC are “not as effective” as smaller decisions groups; “it is more difficult to decide matters involving national security if there is a wider group present.”

There also may have been some initial hope that a strong policy-making linkage would develop between the president and the secretary of state, perhaps along the lines of the Truman-Dean Acheson relationship. The choice of Dean Rusk, a cautious and reticent man, precluded that possibility. (Alternatively it may have just been a rhetorical ploy to satisfy critics, with JFK intending to serve as his own secretary of state all along).

But what developed was haphazard. The early policy process was highly problematic, culminating in the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 1961. Bundy recognized that organizational changes were needed, but he had difficulty gaining Kennedy’s attention and support. In a May 16, 1961 memo to the president, Bundy told Kennedy that although the White House was once again the “center of energy...We do have a problem of management; centrally it is a problem of your use of time and your use of staff...but in the process you have overstrained your own calendar, limited your chances for thought, and used your staff incompletely. You are altogether too valuable to go on this way.” Bundy then proposed three correctives. One suggestion was that the president try to stick to his schedule. The second was more regular and focused meetings with Bundy: Kennedy needed a “real and regular time each day for national security discussion and action.” The third was better staff work.

Bundy began to fill the vacuum, especially in meeting more frequently with JFK. Organizational changes that he did make increased his power and that of his NSC staff. Abolishment of the Planning Board and OCB eliminated staff positions involved in interdepartmental coordination of the policy-making and implementation processes. In their place, Bundy and his staff became more directly involved as the authors of national security policy—even though jerry-rigged “task forces” were often constituted to provide some semblance of wider coordination and input. In place of the OCB, Bundy and his staff took on the job of issuing National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) informing recipients of policy directives. Yet Bundy’s NSAMs lacked the rigor of the Eisenhower deliberative process: they were directed at “action” rather than “planning,” on “what was happening at the moment.” With all these changes and despite any organizational weaknesses, the NSC staff—and the NSC advisor—were potentially placed in a greater policy advocacy role, eclipsing any initial hope for a return to State Department dominance.

Bundy would press Kennedy for further attention to organizational matters throughout the remaining years of his presidency, but efforts were fitful. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy had worked out a better venue for his collegial decision making with the creation of ExCom (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council). But as Bundy would tell him in April 1963, ExCom was a good first step and “a good instrument for major interdepartmental decision.” But it was “not so good for lesser matters of coordination.” In his view, ExCom “has not proved effective at all, except during the extraordinary week of October 16-22, in the process of forward planning.”

28. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, May 16, 1961, President's Office Files, Staff Memoranda-Bundy, Kennedy Library.
31. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 2 1963, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Kennedy Library. It is also worth noting that Robert Kennedy had expressed his own concerns to his brother about the need for a better decision process. At the end of a memo calling for more meetings to discuss Cuba and South American policy, the attorney general noted that: "PS: I think this kind of effort should be applied to other problems as well. The best minds (*me) in Government should be utilized in fining solutions to these major problems. They
Nor were some of Bundy’s organizational changes all that beneficial. It was he who now regularly briefed the president on intelligence matters, not the CIA director (at Eisenhower’s NSC meetings) or through the staff secretary position that Gen. Andrew Goodpaster had effectively operated. As Goodpaster would later recollect, “raw intelligence. . . should not come to the president. You can give the president too much. . .not even McGeorge Bundy, as brilliant as he is, can do a job of analysis for the staff over in CIA and DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency].”[32]

Bundy’s tenure as NSC advisor also begins to reveal some of the tensions in the various parts of the role as it came to be expanded. While Bundy was sometimes concerned for effective organization, he was often an advocate rather than an honest broker during meetings. The secret tape recordings of ExCom’s meetings during the missile crisis, for example, reveal Bundy largely voicing his own policy views, not the serving as the central agent testing for weaknesses in options, questioning assumptions, or other activities such as encouraging the airing of underrepresented views.[33] During Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, although Bundy often cautioned him about the need to explore more deeply the various policy options on Vietnam before him in 1964 and 1965, Bundy’s memos sometimes tilted the deck in favor of courses he preferred. It was not a successfully mix.

Not only was he a policy advocate, in very marked contrast to his Eisenhower predecessors, Bundy and his staff also became increasingly involved in operations. With the creation of the White House Situation Room after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Bundy and his staff directly received cable traffic and other information. This was positive in some sense: they no longer had to rely on what was forwarded (or might not be forwarded) from State, Defense, and the CIA. But with it came greater control. As Karl Inderfurth and Loch Johnson note, the other side of this involvement in operations was “a procedure known as ‘cross-hatching’, . . requiring White House clearance for important outgoing State Department cables.”[34] On many occasions, the NSC staff not only cleared those cables but initiated them.[35]

Involvement in operations increased in the Johnson presidency. Bundy was sent on fact-finding missions to South Vietnam. Most notably he became heavily involved as a key intermediary among the contending parties in the Dominican Republic crisis of May 1965. According to Rusk, “I was skeptical about McGeorge Bundy’s selection to this team, as I would have been about any member of the White House, because his presence involved the White House directly in the outcome.”[36] But it was the State Department’s representative, not Bundy, who would eventually guide policy toward a resolution.[37]

Under Johnson, Bundy’s public visibility increased. He became one of the chief defenders of the administration’s Vietnam war policy. We clearly see here another marked departure from the Eisenhower years. Bundy was a more effective spokesperson in the Johnson years than the more placid Rusk. Yet his efforts sometimes were overbearing and aroused controversy. They also began

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35. Preston, The War Council, 42.
to grate on a media attentive and distrustful Johnson. At one “debate” between Bundy and Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, a prominent University of Chicago professor of international relations, according to historian Andrew Preston, Bundy’s “aggressive debating tactics came across as mean spirited,” marked “a particularly sour moment” in his tenure as NSC advisor, and they “struck blows to the administration’s credibility.”38 The debate didn’t help his relations with the president either: LBJ had not given Bundy permission to appear, was livid at his defiance, and even temporarily told aide Bill Moyers that he was going to fire Bundy.39 Bundy’s picture on the cover of *Time* magazine and a lengthy, favorable article that week did not help matters.

Bundy developed extensive contact with the Washington press corps, especially key figures such as Walter Lippman, Joseph Alsop, Ben Bradlee, and reporters from the *New York Times* and the Washington papers, especially the *Post*. These contacts were in marked departure from his press-shy Eisenhower predecessors, but they set a foundation that would be followed by his successors. Johnson, however, kept a wary eye on Bundy’s dealing with reporters and had him report on press contacts. On one occasion, Johnson refused permission for Bundy to appear on *Meet the Press*; Bundy was disappointed, telling Johnson “I admit I enjoy this kind of thing.”40

**II. THE MODERN NSC ADVISOR**

For Bundy and his successors, the responsibilities of the NSC advisor have grown. The particular combination of these tasks varies from one NSC advisor to another, as does the emphases given to each and the particular ways they have been carried out.

**RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NSC ADVISOR**

Some responsibilities that more recent NSC advisors have taken on relate directly to the president:

- source of personal advice and counsel to the president
- focal channel for information during situations of crisis
- conduit for written information to and from the other principals
- organizer of the president’s daily national security briefing
- provision of day-to-day staff support to the president
- watchdog of the president’s political interests as they relate to national security matters

In addition to responsibilities relating to a president’s cognitive decision-making needs, Alexander George has noted several other presidential needs that, by implication, the NSC advisor might have a place in fulfilling:

- providing emotional support
- assisting a president in gaining understanding and support for actions taken within the circle of presidential advisors
- assistance in obtaining political support and a sense of legitimacy for those decisions and actions from the even wider audience of Congress and the public41

Some responsibilities relate more broadly to the foreign policy environment:

- service as a visible spokesperson and media figure

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- involvement in the implementation of national security policy, including diplomatic contacts and sometimes diplomatic missions

Some relate to the operations of the National Security Council or the meetings of its subset—the “principals”—which is the more frequent forum for deliberation among the presidents and his or her top advisers:
  - coordination of lower-level agency and department input before it reaches higher level policy makers
  - setting of meeting agendas
  - tasks related to making sure meetings operate effectively
  - efforts after meetings to communicate presidential decisions and relay information about other policy matters

Some relate to the NSC staff:
  - selection of skilled and experienced personnel
  - selection, especially, of an effective deputy NSC advisor
  - effective organization of the different layers and sub-units of the NSC staff system so that they contribute to effective decision making
  - effective provision, as part of that organizational task, of an inter-agency process that brings agencies and departments—and the NSC staff--into the early stages of policy formulation in a cooperative and workable manner
  - other managerial tasks such as fostering good morale, commitment to presidential policy goals, but also fostering an organizational atmosphere that tolerates reasonable dissent

Transition Challenges: One of the major tasks during a transition is to figure out which “package” of these various duties is most appropriate. Part will depend on what the NSC advisor brings to the table in terms of experience and expertise. Part will depend on the strengths and weaknesses of other actors. For example, are the secretaries of state or defense likely to be effective spokespersons? If so, the need for the NSC advisor to do so may be lessened a bit, and vice versa. Likewise, what substantive expertise do they bring to policy matters? That will likely have some impact on the NSC advisor’s exercise of policy advocacy. A major part also depends on the president-elect. What foreign policy experience does the president-elect possess? What broader foreign and national security policies and goals have been articulated in the campaign? Finally, part will depend on other aspects of the NSC advisor’s role and the context in which it is situated, to which we will now turn.

III. A CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY: THE NEED FOR HONEST BROKERAGE

One of the most important responsibilities, perhaps “foundational” in its relation to effective policy making, is the presence of what has come to be termed honest brokerage. The role of the NSC advisor as an honest broker in the national security decision process has its practical origins in the Eisenhower presidency. As a matter of academic scrutiny, it is best embodied in Alexander George’s discussion of the NSC advisor as “managerial custodian.” According to George, six tasks are required of the managerial custodian:
  - balancing actor resources within the policy-making system;
  - strengthening weaker advocates;
  - bringing in new advisers to argue for unpopular options;
• setting up new channels of information so that the president and other advisers are not
dependent upon a single channel;
• arranging for independent evaluation of decisional premises and options, when
necessary;
• monitoring the workings of the policy-making process to identify possibly dangerous
malfunctions and instituting appropriate corrective action.42

George's list represents an ideal; no NSC advisor, even in the Eisenhower years, embraced all of
them. However, a more limited and practicable definition of the broker role might include two
general elements distilled from them: 1) a concern for the fair and balanced representation of views
among the principals and others at various points in the deliberative process; and 2) attention to the
quality of the organization and processes in which deliberation occurs at various stages.

There is a strong case to be made that honest brokerage is an important and vital contributor—
although not necessarily the only contributor—to effective decision making. Many NSC advisors
have identified honest brokerage as an important part of the job of being an effective advisor. As
Brent Scowcroft—who served as NSC advisor under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush
(and deputy under Nixon)—points out, brokerage remains central, if not foundational to being
effective in that role:

If you are not an honest broker the system doesn’t work well. The first thing you have to do
is to establish in the minds of all of the members of the NSC that their views will be
presented honestly and straightforwardly to the president….Once they are comfortable with
that, they certainly expect that you will present your own views but that you will do it in a
way that doesn’t disadvantage theirs.43

According to Anthony Lake, President Bill Clinton’s NSC advisor during his first term, while he
increasingly expressed his own policy views, “I tried at the same time to absolutely be an honest
broker, because if that doesn’t happen the whole system collapses. I am positive I never blocked any
information or access by anybody else.”44

Some empirical studies of what makes for decision-making success identify the presence of
some components of the honest broker role. Greenstein and I found the presence of honest
brokerage to be a positive contributing factor to Eisenhower's 1954 Indochina decision making,
while its absence was notable in Johnson's problematic escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965.45
Meena Bose reached similar conclusions about Eisenhower in her study, noting now a contrast with
Bundy’s tenure as NSC advisor under JFK.46 Early empirical confirmation of the benefits of the
broker role was also established by Roger Porter in his extensive examination of the Economic
Policy Board during the Ford administration.47 Other studies have suggested higher quality policy
decisions when brokerage was present.48

42. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, 195-196.
44. Burke telephone interview with Anthony Lake, November 1, 2007.
45. John P. Burke and Fred I Greenstein, with Larry Berman and Richard Immerman, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on
46. Meena Bose, Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and
214-215.
48. See the nineteen case studies from the Truman through Nixon presidencies in Gregory M. Herek, Irving L. Janis, and
Paul Huth, “Decision Making during International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 31(2, 1987): 203-226. Also see the ten case studies from the Truman through the G. H. W. Bush
presidencies in Patrick J. Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Decision
Making, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997. In both studies, the decisions that showed fewest symptoms
of defective decision making occurred in the Eisenhower presidency.
Likewise studies of decision failures, such as the Tower Commission’s report on the Iran-Contra scandal of the Reagan years, have identified problems that might have been remedied through more effective brokerage activity. As its report notes,

The Iran initiative ran directly counter to the Administration’s own policies on terrorism, the Iran/Iraq war, and military support to Iran... Established procedures for making national security decisions were ignored. Reviews of the initiative by all the NSC principals were too infrequent. The initiatives were not adequately vetted below the cabinet level. Intelligence resources were underutilized. Applicable legal constraints were not adequately addressed... This pattern persisted in the implementation of the Iran initiative. The NSC staff assumed direct operational control... How the initiative was to be carried out never received adequate attention from the NSC principals or a tough working-level review. No periodic evaluation of the progress of the initiative was ever conducted. The result was an unprofessional and, in substantial part, unsatisfactory operation.49

The Tower Commission’s recommendations for reform are also notable in the way they echo many of the components of the broker role. “It is the National Security Adviser who is primarily responsible for managing this process on a daily basis. It is his responsibility to ensure”:

- that matters submitted for consideration by the Council cover the full range of issues on which review is required
- that those issues are fully analyzed
- that a full range of options is considered
- that the prospects and risks of each are examined
- that all relevant intelligence and other information is available to the principals
- that legal considerations are addressed
- that difficulties in implementation are confronted

The national security advisor, moreover, has these responsibilities “not only with respect to the president but with respect to all the NSC principals.” They should be “informed of the president’s thinking and decisions.” They should have “adequate notice and an agenda for all meetings.” Decision papers should be “provided in advance.” Adequate records should be kept of “NSC consultations and presidential decisions.” Finally, it is the responsibility of the NSC advisor “to monitor policy implementation and to ensure that policies are executed in conformity with the intent of the president’s decisions.”50

**Transition Challenges**: Is the place of honest brokerage recognized in selecting a candidate for national security advisor? Is the president-elect cognizant of its importance? There is tremendous pressure during the transition to select persons who have been loyal to the candidate, allegiant to his or her agenda, and hopefully knowledgeable about the substance of policy. But decision making after Inauguration Day may require more: attention to how that decision making can operate effectively and, especially, the role of the NSC advisor in fulfilling that task.

**IV. TENSIONS WITH OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE ADVISOR ROLE**

The Tower Commission’s findings and recommendations offer powerful warnings about NSC advisors who abandon brokerage and become too deeply enmeshed in policy formulation and


implementation. Yet more recent NSC advisors may have had legitimate reasons for expanding their responsibilities beyond those of their Eisenhower-era forebears. Policy advocacy, political involvement, and diplomatic and other implementation efforts have become attached to the duties of some—perhaps if not all—recent NSC advisors. These additional responsibilities signal the presence of powerful forces at work that need to be understood in making a realistic assessment of the role of the NSC advisor in the contemporary era. During transitions, they are components of the NSC advisor’s job that need to be carefully factored in, both in defining the job and in selecting an appropriate person for the position.

**ADVOCATING POLICY**

Policy advocacy, whether among the deliberations of the principals or in the form of counsel tendered privately to the president, is common to all post-Eisenhower NSC advisors in one form or another. Yet it also can be problematic. For example, the introduction to the oral history project of the Brookings Institution on the role of the NSC advisor (which included a roundtable and interviews with nine former national security advisors) observes that: “Since the Kennedy administration, the assistant to the president for national security affairs (a.k.a. 'the national security adviser') has played two roles: manager ('honest broker') of the day-to-day policy process and substantive policy adviser.” At the same time, the introduction goes on to note that “Presidents clearly want both, but the roles are in tension. . . .Some national security advisers have balanced these roles adroitly. Others have not, generating discord within the president’s senior advisory team.”

A more robustly defined role for the NSC advisor—especially in the area of policy advocacy—portends difficulty. According to I. M. Destler, “it changes the staff from mediating between the president and senior officialdom to that of substituting for officialdom, reducing the president’s perceived need to work with and through established channels.” Where brokerage is largely absent and where the national security advisor acts as the dominant policy voice to the president, the risks for error are great, especially as exclusion of other views may come about.

Yet, as Anthony Lake recognizes, some balance may be possible. Modern NSC advisors often present their own policy views, “but you also have to make sure that the others know what the views are so there are no surprises.” At the same time, in Lake’s view, the NSC advisor must be concerned that the national security system is serving the president’s decision-making needs: “you have to drive the process, and you have to understand that only the NSC can do that.” Issues are more cross-cutting than they were in the 1950s and “practically every issue now has an economic, military, political, diplomatic dimension, [making] it hard for any cabinet officer to have the absolute lead on that issue. . . .So it has to be coordinated and it has to be led from the White House.” Lake’s own efforts over the summer of 1995 to craft an “Endgame Strategy” for resolving the impasse between the Muslims and the Serbs in Bosnia represents an important and successful effort by an NSC advisor to take a more active role in the policy process. But in Lake’s view, his advocacy did not stand alone, brokerage was also present: “It was a case of honest broker in the sense that everybody’s views were there but I certainly was pushing as hard as I could and in every way I could.”

For academic observers, such as Destler, striking the right balance may provide a solution: “discreet advice or advocacy” is permissible in moderation, but “strong, visible internal advocacy

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54. Burke telephone interview with Anthony Lake, November 1, 2007.
(except of already established presidential priorities)” is not. Destler’s position is echoed in the conclusions of the Tower Commission Report: “To the extent that the national security adviser becomes a strong advocate. . .his role as ‘honest broker’ may be compromised and the president’s access to the unedited views of the NSC principals may be impaired.” For Carnes Lord, counterbalancing bureaucratic interests may call for advocacy, “for there can be no guarantee that agency heads will in all cases subordinate their own interests and perspectives to the strategic perspective represented by the [NSC] adviser.” In fact, for Lord, that “strategic perspective” offers special entree for advocacy: “The [NSC] adviser should be considered to have the right to provide advice in his capacity as strategic planner.” Presidents may choose to embrace the “tactical, political, or personal factors” of others, but only the NSC advisor “can be relied on to keep the strategic perspective within presidential view.”

Transition Challenges: In considering the responsibilities of NSC advisor, advocacy must be factored in, but within limits. Some advocacy might be called for if:

- bureaucratic positions fail to cover the full range of options or opinion
- effective brokerage has generated trust and confidence in the process
- competing views are fairly and fully represented
- participants have a right of appeal
- the NSC advisor is not perceived as pursuing a wholesale policy agenda
- advocacy is discreet and not overbearing—yet others are aware of what the NSC advisor has advocated
- advocacy is seen as generally representing the president’s unique, broader strategic interests

Public Visibility

Like advocacy, the public visibility of the NSC advisor has also become part of the job. Some NSC advisors such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski were highly visible if not their administration’s chief foreign policy spokespersons. Others, such as Scowcroft and Lake, had public presences more akin to their predecessors under Eisenhower.

As with advocacy, there is a price to be paid when the NSC advisor becomes a highly visible figure. A number of effects seem possible: competition and bruised relationships with the other principals, the possibility of public pronouncements “locking in” the NSC advisor (and by implication the White House) to set positions and commitments, perceptions of a personal agenda and questions about fairness that might detract from the broker role, and perhaps even the time taken away from other duties.

In the view of the Tower Commission, the NSC advisor should operate offstage, out of the eye of the media and the public: “Ideally, the national security adviser should not have a high public profile. He should not try to compete with the secretary of state or the secretary of defense as the articulator of public policy. . . .While a ‘passion for anonymity’ is perhaps too strong a term, the national security adviser should generally operate offstage.” For Robert Cutler, Eisenhower’s first NSC assistant, anonymity was not too strong a term: “an ‘anonymous’ Assistant to the President has no charter to speak for his Chief in public.” And anonymity, in turn, strengthened his relation to the

president. In their private meetings, Cutler recounts in his memoirs, Eisenhower often “seemed to be thinking out loud to test his ideas on someone whom he trusted to keep his mouth shut.”

Yet given the media realities of the 21st century compared to those of the 1950’s and 1960’s—or even the pre-cable world of the 1970’s and the pre-internet world of the early 1990’s—the NSC advisor is likely to become a public explainer and defender of the administration’s policies. As Lake acknowledges, “I think the president and I probably paid a price for how little I did.”

**Transition Challenges:** As with advocacy, early consideration should be given to the degree and character of the NSC advisor’s public role. Again, balance is important. A more public role may be appropriate if:
- the secretaries of state and defense are the administration’s principal spokespersons
- the other principals are comfortable with the NSC advisor’s public role
- the NSC advisor is an effective public presence
- public activities are carefully orchestrated within a broader communications strategy and the NSC advisor is not free-lancing or flying solo
- at a minimum, the public role of the NSC advisor is a matter that should be threshed out among the principals and the president-elect during the transition period

**Political Advice, Partisan Involvement**

Another facet, although usually present in lesser degree, of the job of more contemporary NSC advisors is either tendering advice of a more political nature or, on occasion, engaging in what might be regarded as partisan political activity. Again, there are costs. Too much political advice or partisan involvement can weaken the NSC advisor’s stance as an objective source of policy advice. In Lake’s view, a perception of partisanship can “diminish his or her credibility, and only adds to the distrust and divisions between the Executive and Congress.” Moreover, “if the national security advisor is perceived as being political or, worse, offering advice to the president on political grounds, it shakes confidence in the administration, which in itself is bad politics.”

Yet, interjection of political calculation may be important in a decision process. As William Newmann notes, “the president’s policy choices are deeply dependent on his overall political beliefs, goals, and fortunes at any given point.” Furthermore, political calculation might play an important role given that policy and politics cannot be neatly separated and are in fact deeply intertwined: Which policy positions will gain greater congressional support? Which will enlist the cooperation of allies, especially in light of their respective domestic political situations? How will political forces cause adversaries to react? Many of these seem to be questions that the NSC advisor might be in a position to answer or at least contribute to during deliberations. They have bearing both on the substance of national security policy as well as the feasibility of one option over another. Policy making cannot operate in a political vacuum if it is to be effective.

At the same time, other senses of political calculation, more akin to that of being a political watchdog, seem more problematic: Which policy option will prove popular with the public or aid the president’s broader political standing? Here a “too political” NSC advisor might endanger the broker role. Good policy sometimes does not make for good politics and vice versa.

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63. Burke telephone interview with Anthony Lake, November 1, 2007.
Political or partisan involvement rather than political advice raises a separate set of role-related concerns. In the minds of some NSC advisors, some forms of involvement are reasonable, others are not. According to Frank Carlucci, Ronald Reagan's NSC advisor after Iran-Contra, “I think defending the president's position is perfectly legitimate, but actively engaging in and organizing political activity is inappropriate.”\(^{65}\) Condoleezza Rice’s strong public involvement in the 2004 election was the subject of criticism at the time and would come back to haunt her during her confirmation hearings for secretary of state.

**Transition Challenges:** Politicization of the NSC advisor’s role is an area that should be considered during the transition. If advocacy is problematic, perceptions of pursuing a political agenda or becoming a partisan figure are even more so. Yet the interjection of political considerations into the policy process by the NSC advisor might be in occasional order if:

- the NSC advisor is uniquely positioned to offer certain forms of political counsel (e.g. domestic politics of foreign governments)
- issues dealing with political impact are not adequately presented in the counsel coming from other principals (potentially part of the broker role)
- more public activities are directed at explaining or defending the administration’s positions, while perceptions of a partisan political agenda and direct political involvement are generally avoided

**Diplomacy, Operations, and Policy Implementation**

The involvement of the NSC advisor in implementing policy, whether partaking in diplomatic contacts, undertaking missions abroad, or engaging in other activities that carry out rather than formulate policy is another potential part of the job. Again, such activities begin in the post-Eisenhower era. At best, the OCB provided an institutional mechanism for interagency oversight; implementing policy was the province of State, Defense, or the CIA. Direct involvement in policy implementation can be problematic, whether Kissinger’s secret diplomatic missions or Adm. John Poindexter’s *sub rosa* efforts in Iran-Contra. The latter is especially notable, given the difficulties it caused the Reagan presidency. According to the Tower Commission, the NSC advisor “should focus on advice and management, not implementation and execution. Implementation is the responsibility and the strength of the departments and agencies.” The NSC advisor and staff “generally do not have the depth of resources for the conduct of operations.” As well, involvement in operations risks “compromising their objectivity.”\(^{66}\) So too for Carlucci’s practices post Iran-Contra: “I came in with the firm idea that we shouldn’t be involved in operational matters, least of all running covert action programs, that our fundamental mission was policy coordination, policy oversight, and seeing that the president’s policies were implemented, not necessarily implementing them ourselves.”\(^{67}\)

Yet, NSC advisors are sometimes involved in diplomatic efforts that involve policy implementation. Back-channel negotiations and a range of secret and sometimes not so secret diplomatic missions are not uncommon. Moreover, foreign governments—especially the Soviet Union in the Cold War years—have sometimes requested more private diplomatic contact with the White House through the NSC advisor or to have the NSC advisor serve as an emissary on sensitive missions. Such needs must be accommodated.

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Unique circumstances may dictate the involvement of the NSC advisor in operational matters, as was the case with Kissinger’s negotiations on normalizing relations with China. As Robert McFarlane observes, had normal channels been used, “it would not have otherwise succeeded. . . . you had to be able to find out if the Chinese were even interested—secretly. Once we confirmed that they were, if you had brought in Democrats and bureaucrats throughout the government, it would have leaked and quickly been aborted.” 68 But even in this case, errors were made that required later correction. More generally, as Walter Isaacson points out, no matter how great Kissinger was “as a gunslinger, the lone cowboy cannot build a policy based on tending to various complex alliances unless he is willing to share information and authority with the bureaucracy.” Kissinger launched an “age of bombshell diplomacy.” However, “In the long run this trend will probably prove more exciting than wise.” 69 In the short run of the Nixon presidency, Kissinger’s efforts to keep his diplomatic activities secret enraged Secretary of State Rogers and were a central source of tensions between State and the NSC advisor and his staff that festered for years. It was a problem that would vex Nixon personally, test his patience, and take up much time, as H. R. Haldeman’s diaries frequently attest. 70

Another impetus for diplomatic activity is an effort to emphasize a president’s personal interest and concern in a foreign policy issue. According to Lake, “The secretary of state should be the chief diplomatic officer of the United States government. But sometimes it can be more effective for the White House to do it.” “In those cases” according to Lake, efforts were undertaken, “without burning the bridge, turning it into a Vance and Brzezinski, Kissinger and Rogers.” 71

That said, concerns still may remain, particularly as an operational role may commit the NSC advisor to policies and positions that then later render him or her unable to objectively advise the president.

**Transition Challenges:** Involvement in policy implementation and on-going operations appears to be the riskiest expansion of the NSC advisor’s role. Indeed the difficulties are quite apparent in the semantics of the job title: NSC advisor rather than bureaucratic operative. Yet some limited activities may be feasible if:

- they are directed at monitoring and oversight
- they result from special circumstances, such as the expectations of foreign governments or as signals of a particular presidential concern or direction, rather than serve as routine practices
- they avoid “free-lancing” and the other principals are informed about and in agreement with them
- they are carefully weighed against any negative consequences

**V. THE NSC ADVISOR IN CONTEXT**

Another set of factors to consider in the appropriate definition of the NSC advisor’s role is the place of that person within a web of other actors and broader advisory arrangements. Two particularly stand out: the relation of the NSC advisor to the president and then to the other principals.

68. Daalder and Destler, “The Role of the National Security Adviser,” 46.
70. The published version of select diary entries can be found in H. R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House*, New York: Putnam, 1984. The originals, which are both in written and (later) recorded form, are located at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives, College Park, MD.
One very important contextual factor is the fit of the NSC advisor’s role with the president’s own desires and expectations as a decision maker. The paramount position that the president’s needs serve in considering how decision-making processes, structures, and organizations are crafted and how the particular roles of those involved in them are defined is well recognized. In general, it would be poor practice to set out an advisory system that did not fit well with a president’s decision-making and managerial style.

The NSC advisor is in a particularly important position. His or her proximity to the Oval Office makes them a daily barometer of presidential inclination, intention, and policy will. The need for “fit” appears especially strong. According to Colin Powell, who served as Reagan’s last NSC advisor, “At the end of the day, the duty of the National Security Council staff and the assistant is to mold themselves to the personality of the president.” More generally, according to the Tower Commission, “Because the system is the vehicle through which the president formulates and implements his national security policy, it must adapt to each individual president’s style and management philosophy.” Scowcroft, one of the three principal members of the Tower Commission, particularly emphasizes that “advisers must learn to respond to the way in which a president wants information; otherwise they will either frustrate the president or the president will go around the system to get his own information.”

Yet, there are downsides to a perfect fit: some personal predilections may be sources of decision-making weaknesses. As Carnes Lord observes, “presidents should expect to pay severe penalties for indulging quirks of their personalities... at the expense of institutional arrangements that reflect the basic logic of the presidential office.” As Bowie and Immerman point out, for example, Nixon “perverted the entire system to serve his own and Henry Kissinger’s penchant for secrecy and deviousness.” Catering to Nixon’s quirks and idiosyncracies ultimately proved costly—not so much to Kissinger but to Nixon and his presidency. Bundy meshed well with JFK, yet his adjustment to the Johnson persona may have been too close a fit for a president with strong emotions and weak decision-making instincts. Reagan’s emotional commitment to freeing the hostages in Lebanon encouraged NSC advisor Robert McFarlane to devise the arms-for-hostages scheme, and it was an operation whose implications Reagan apparently did not fully grasp at the time. Reagan’s loose management and reliance on delegation provided an opportunity for Admiral Poindexter, McFarlane’s successor, to take it upon himself to add the diversion of funds to the Nicaragua contras piece of it, which would ultimately prove so damaging.

The close proximity of the NSC advisor to the president raises another set of concerns: the temptation to bypass the broader system and make decisions on the fly. Powell, for example, always exercised care when he met privately with Reagan: he would invite someone else along and make sure that someone was taking notes. Perhaps it was his innate caution, perhaps he sought to avoid misunderstandings with the other principals, or perhaps it was a lesson he drew from Iran-Contra. Scowcroft also was careful that his morning meeting with the president not become an occasion for presidential decision making without the knowledge and participation of the other principals. “The president can make a decision anytime he wants,” Scowcroft notes. But, mindful of what had transpired at points between Reagan and his NSC advisors during Iran-Contra, “when that happened and the president said ‘I think we ought to do this,’ I said, ‘Fine, we’ll do that; but let me check with my colleagues and see if there are any problems we haven’t thought about.’ So I would call around...
to them and say, ‘The president wants to do this, do you have a problem with it?’” In addition, Scowcroft had his deputy, Robert Gates, attend in order to make sure that what transpired was interpreted properly; the same went for meetings of the NSC as well. In Scowcroft’s view, they were all part of the honest broker role. Lake also made it a practice not to use his private meetings with Clinton to press for a decision in the direction that he favored, as Kissinger had done:

When you are with the president, it could be very tempting on the every morning when you are meeting with the president to use that to make decisions. At least in my mind I was trying to make those implementation meetings on decisions that had already been made: “You want me to be doing this, you want me to be doing that”. . . and then teeing up policy discussions, saying “you are going to have to have a meeting on this or a meeting on that.” And certainly giving my advice but never letting that come to a final policy decision.

Presidents also face their own responsibilities in dealing with the NSC advisor. They must be prepared to listen, prioritize when necessary, set goals, and ultimately make decisions. One example: at their daily briefings, as Powell relates, Reagan “listened carefully and asked a few questions, but gave no guidance.” “We would lay out the contrasting views. . . and wait for the president to peel them back to get at underlying motives.” Carlucci would present his recommendations, but was often unclear of Reagan’s decision; “Was that a yes?” he would later ask Powell.

As well, presidents are the ultimate managers of the process and must recognize that task as a presidential one. According to Powell, “The president’s management style placed a tremendous burden on us.” When Powell took over as NSC advisor, Reagan “never spoke to me about the job, never laid out his expectations, never provided any guidance.” Reagan also let the interpersonal tensions and disputes between Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger fester on too long. Similarly, George W. Bush failed to rein in Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld’s practice of not taking seriously the NSC deliberative process.

Transition Challenges: Meeting presidential needs and predilections matter and should be part of the calculus during the transition about how the job of the NSC advisor is defined and how broader advisory arrangements are structured. Yet simple fit may fail to adjust for presidential weaknesses. NSC advisors, once in office, also need to be attentive to their personal time with the president and avoid hasty decisions that may short-circuit the wider deliberative process. Presidents must recognize that they are the ultimate managers in defining expectations, holding participants accountable, and making the system work effectively. The latter seems especially a set of tasks that might be profitably undertaken during the transition or early on in the new administration.

NSC Advisor and the Other Principals

One thing that does appear clear is that administrations will have to have live with an enhanced role for the NSC advisor. We cannot return to the days when the State Department and the secretary of state were dominant. As Bert Rockman explains, presidents “find their political and policy needs better served from within the White House. From this vantage point, the departments sooner or later are perceived as representing interests that are not those of the president.” Nor, according to Rockman, can the secretary of state serve as both foreign minister and chief policy advocate: “To be

83. Powell, My American Journey, 334.
84. Powell, My American Journey, 349.
both, foreign minister (representing departmental perspectives) and leading foreign policy maker has within it increasingly the seeds of an insoluble role conflict.85

Another dynamic is that foreign and national security policy problems have grown more complex and require cross-cutting input from a variety of agencies and departments. No one department can usually claim exclusive or near-exclusive domain. As Anthony Lake explains,

There are systemic reasons why it is almost inevitable that there will be increasing emphasis on the national security advisor. . . . getting more involved. . . . the fact is that in a world in which practically every issue now has an economic, military, political, diplomatic, etc., dimension, it is very hard for any cabinet officer to have the absolute lead on that issue.

This is so because the other cabinet officers increasingly have equity on those issues and they are simply not going to follow that lead. So it has to be coordinated and it has to be led from the White House, and while presidents can do that in making general decisions, it can only be done on a day-to-day basis out of the NSC staff.86

As part of that centrality, the NSC advisor has a crucial task in setting the tone of the interpersonal relationships among the principals. Some NSC advisors have used their pivotal position as gatekeepers to block the information and advice coming from others and to pursue their own policy agendas. Others are more facilitators: rendering advice, but making sure that others are heard. Striking the right balance in relation to the other principals is important in operating effectively and achieving success.

As Lake notes, “A lot of it depends upon personalities. Always.”87 According to Scowcroft, “It’s all personality. . . . I think you need to always be conscious of the interplay of personalities.”88 Making the various personalities work effectively together clearly contributes to a better advisory process. As Joseph Sisco--a key deputy secretary of state on Middle East affairs during the Nixon and Ford years--observes, “I think it would have been a much easier relationship if Henry [Kissinger] had cooperated more fully with [Secretary of State] Bill Rogers and if there had been much greater sensitivity about the personal relationship. Henry admits this in his book.”89 By contrast, as Secretary of State James Baker observes of the Bush Sr. team, they were a group of “experienced, collegial peers who had worked together in one capacity or another and who liked and respected one another. . . . we trusted one another.” Policy differences were sometimes present. Cheney and Scowcroft were more cautious than he was about changing policy, according to Baker. But these differences never led to the “backbiting of the Kissinger-Rogers, Vance-Brzezinski eras or the slugfests of our national security teams during the Reagan years.”90

Part of the equation is also presidential and what he or she brings to the table. The Bush Sr. foreign policy team had much less bureaucratic infighting compared to its Reagan predecessor even though the principals were skilled, experienced, and with well-developed policy views. Part had to do with Scowcroft’s conception of his role; part, too, the experience of Baker and others who had gone through the Reagan years. But part was also George H.W. Bush’s: he understood the institutional and interpersonal forces at work. As he notes in A World Transformed, “Brent and Jim did get moderately crosswise, but very rarely.” On the one hand, Baker “worried he might be excluded from a decision that affected his department. As a former chief of staff, he knew how a strong-willed presidential adviser, if backed by the president, can easily isolate a cabinet member.” On the other hand, Scowcroft and the NSC staff “were also concerned about what State might be up to.” The

86. Burke telephone interview with Anthony Lake, November 1, 2007.
management challenge was recognized and dealt with, not just by the principals but by President Bush himself: “We tried very hard, and I think successfully, to keep all the participants informed and eliminate personality clashes which could undermine policy-making as well as effective diplomacy.”

Transition Challenges: Personalities matter, and it is part of the job of NSC advisor to think about the collective contribution all the principals make to presidential decision making. How the NSC advisor defines the job and works on a daily basis can foster good relations or it can inhibit them. And, again, the president has a management task in setting the tone and eliminating sources of tension. The issue especially has a temporal dimension. These personnel choices are first made during the transition to office. Presidents-elect and their transition advisers make a variety of calculations in selecting key appointees. In the area of national security, how those individuals are likely to work together—not just their merits qua individuals—especially needs to be factored in.

VI: INTERAGENCY PLANNING AND COORDINATION

NSC advisors, particularly at the start of a new administration, play a crucial role in how the decision-making process is organized, most especially with regard to interagency input and coordination. Cutler’s efforts in almost single-handedly creating the Eisenhower-era system were notable, as were Bundy’s efforts to disband them and then struggle to find an effective substitute. Subsequent NSC advisors have been equally important in putting their imprint on the broader interagency process.

Some administrations have favored a system in which the State Department is placed in the leading role, others one in which the NSC advisor dominates. Both have proven problematic. In March 1966, the interagency coordination process below the level of the NSC was finally more formalized—during the Kennedy-Johnson years—with overall direction and authority given the secretary of state. A Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) was created, chaired by the under secretary of state. A variety of Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs) was also established, usually chaired by a regional representative from State. A special group on Vietnam was created (chaired by the under secretary of state) as well as a principals’ level group on arms control (chaired by Rusk). The State Department-led process, however, harkened back to the weak system under Truman and proved less than effective.

During the 1968 transition, Nixon partially embraced but also departed from the NSC process in which he himself had participated in as vice president: he wanted more and better organization but without, as Kissinger notes, “lowest common denominator” recommendations or single choices. Based on recommendations by Kissinger, former Harvard colleague Morton Halperin, and Gen.

94. According to Inderfurth and Johnson, “the SIG framework never became a very effective method for interagency coordination” (“Transformation,” 67). Also see Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, 104-105. According to Roger Morris, the SIGs and the IRGs “became merely rubber stamps for the process of passing on consensus memoranda, brokered by inter-agency vetos” (Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, 75). According to Bromley Smith, then the executive secretary of the NSC, representatives from State “began sending papers from the [SIG] directly to the president, shorting out the secretary of state...it was not a satisfactory procedure.” Rostow “had to pick up the ball and put questions in shape so the president could deal with them” (Bromley Smith Oral History, July 29, 1969, Johnson Library, 19-20).
Andrew Goodpaster, a new system was devised that, while more formally structured, centralized control of policy in Nixon’s—and Kissinger’s—hands. The Johnson-era SIG was abolished. Nor were there to be the more informal Tuesday lunches to work out differences among the principals. Instead, an NSC Review Group was created, below meetings of the full NSC, as well as an NSC Ad Hoc Under Secretary’s Committee, below the NSC Review Group, and a variety of inter-agency regional groups. Key committees were chaired by Kissinger himself, not by departmental representatives. Most important among these latter groups was the interagency Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), set up in April of 1969, to deal with crisis situations. Another was the Review Group, where Kissinger approved papers going to Nixon and NSC members and was able to control the latter’s agenda.

The written record of policy options and deliberations was also strengthened with the creation of National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM)—which reflected Nixon’s policy choices—and background analyses, done on an interagency basis, titled National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM). Some 165 NSSMs were produced during the first term alone. Views vary on whether the NSSMs were just bureaucratic busy work or a useful contribution to policy deliberations.

On December 28, 1968, at Key Biscayne, Nixon told William Rogers, his designate for secretary of state, and Mel Laird, his designate for secretary of state, of the organizational changes. According to Kissinger, “Like so many meetings in the Nixon administration the Key Biscayne session had its script determined in advance.” Rogers and Laird later raised objections, but Nixon resisted any alterations. It was a harbinger of White House determination to dominate the process and a signal of little tolerance of departmental concerns or perspectives. Once again, we see transition errors leading to future costs.

At the start of the Carter presidency, the interagency process was simplified. Two committees were created: a Policy Review Committee (PRC), usually chaired by the secretary of state or another cabinet member as appropriate, and a Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) chaired by NSC advisor Brzezinski himself. The latter dealt with "cross-cutting issues," arms-control policy,

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96. Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s former staff secretary, was on temporary leave from his position as deputy commander in Saigon in order to work on the Nixon transition. In the third volume of his memoirs, Kissinger especially singles out Goodpaster as the “architect” of the new system, as well as an important source in recommending that the NSC adviser rather than departmental representatives (especially State) chair key committees (Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999, 75). Roger Morris, however, regards Halperin—who was then at the Defense Department’s Office of International Security Affairs—as the key force in drafting the new plan and with Goodpaster in more of an after-the-fact approval role (Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 78-84).


98. Rothkopf, Running the World, 120. For a list of NSSMs through early October 1971, see John Lewis, “Kissinger’s Apparatus,” in Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch Johnson, eds., Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 93; 55 NSSMs were ordered by Kissinger in the administration’s first 100 days. Morris points out that the NSSMs trailed off to only 8 in the first four months of 1970. In part this reflected that basic national security policies were now set, but also that “increasingly the most important decisions were to be taken outside the NSC” (Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 92).

99. According to Kissinger, “It enabled me to use the bureaucracy without revealing our purposes” (Isaacs, Kissinger, 155).

100. Kissinger, White House Years, 44; also see Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 86-91.

101. Kissinger, White House Years. Kissinger also provides an interesting account of Nixon’s indecisiveness in personally pressing the issue against Rogers’ and Laird’s opposition by his delay in signing NSDM 2, which put the organizational changes into effect. Nixon finally signed it on January 19. According to Kissinger, NSDM 2 encompassed all the changes Kissinger had proposed, except that Nixon wanted the CIA director to be removed from NSC meetings—an exclusion that Laird and Kissinger eventually got Nixon to rescind (see Kissinger, White House Years, 44-47). Morris notes that a reduced CIA role was in Halperin’s original plan (Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 81, 88).

102. In addition to the two principal committees, there were also lower-level, interdepartmental groups, chaired by senior agency officials, to deal with matters not requiring the attention of the SCC or PRC. Also, Vance usually chaired most PRC meetings, although a few were chaired by the secretary of defense, and a couple by the secretary of the treasury (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 59; Brzezinski Miller Center Oral History, February 18, 1982, Carter Library, 62-64).
intelligence activities, and crisis management. Brzezinski also proposed and Carter approved a procedure for organizing NSC paperwork. Brzezinski and his staff prepared and organized most of the staff work, including the preparation of Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs), as well as gathering information for PRC or SCC meetings, preparing agendas, and coordinating the paper flow. If the principals agreed on policy recommendations, Brzezinski submitted a Presidential Directive (PD) to Carter for approval. If no recommendations were forthcoming, Brzezinski, drawing on his own notes or those of his staff, prepared a summary report for Carter, and the matter would be taken up at the presidential level. It was an orderly process, but one that would create difficulties and reveal the increasingly powerful role of Brzezinski as an advocate and not just a coordinator. The new system was approved by Carter shortly before his inauguration without consultation with Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance or Harold Brown, who had been tapped for Defense.103 According to Vance, "[I] opposed this arrangement from the beginning, and I said so to the president."105

Under Reagan, the major organizational change was the creation of three senior interagency groups (SIGs) that were closely tied to the departments. State took the lead in the SIG on foreign policy, the Pentagon on defense matters, and the CIA on intelligence. A fourth SIG was created a year later on international economic policy, and Treasury was the lead agency. Under the SIGs, interdepartmental working groups—chaired by a representative from the lead department—were charged with developing options to be presented to the SIGs.106

At least at the start of the Reagan presidency, the cabinet secretaries (and the director of the CIA) played a major role in their respective SIGs. Also at the start, the NSC advisor was in a comparatively weaker position. Yet, the SIGs proved less important over time, and they were replaced by a stronger NSC advisor and a staff-directed process.107

THE "SCOWCROFT MODEL"

As part of its recommendations for reform, the Tower Commission especially emphasized the need for better organized and more thorough interagency coordination, which NSC advisor Frank Carlucci and his deputy, Colin Powell, put into practice. Much of the commission’s recommendations was Scowcroft’s handiwork. Plus, he undertook a personal effort: “I actually drew up a model for reform of the NSC system, and I guess I gave it to Carlucci but really Colin Powell.”108 As a result, early in his tenure, Carlucci submitted NSDD 276 on organizational reform to the president. At the top of the new system was a Senior Review Group, to be chaired by the NSC advisor. Below that were several Policy Review Groups, which Powell, as deputy NSC advisor, chaired. NSC staff control of these committees avoided the department-led groups that had often bogged down the development of policy options earlier in the administration. The new system also prevented “many issues leap-frog[ging] from lower level working groups to full scale NSC meetings,

103. On the development of the Carter NSC system, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 10, 58-63.
107. Writing in 1986, Colin Campbell observes that “only the SIG on intelligence remains active. The Crisis Preplanning Group chaired by the NSC staff director for policy development coordinates the administration’s management of major foreign policy emergencies. The Strategic Arms Control Group headed by the assistant to the president for national security affairs [the NSC advisor] has supplanted the SIG on defense. And the Economics Policy Council has absorbed the entire case load of the SIG on International Economic Policy” (Colin Campbell, Managing the Presidency: Carter, Reagan, and the Search for Executive Harmony, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986, 43).
where intense disagreement by the principals often precluded presidential decisions.”

The new system did not sit well with Secretary of State Shultz who opposed the NSC advisor chairing meetings of the principals in the president’s absence. But it set the foundation for what has come to known as the “Scowcroft model.”

Put in place during Scowcroft’s second stint as NSC advisor under Bush Sr., the “model” had three levels. The first, below meetings with the president present, was the principals’ committee. Chaired by Scowcroft, it was a place to bring all the principals productively and cooperatively together. According to Scowcroft, it had special merit because the principals “were able to agree frequently. . . .What it did was save a lot of the president’s time.”

The second level, the deputies’ committee, was even more important in some ways. Its members were drawn from the major departments and agencies, but the group was chaired by Scowcroft’s own deputy (initially Robert Gates). According to one account, the deputies’ group would meet as often as everyday, and its principal task would be to debate and reach agreement on narrowed policy options that could be brought to Bush and his top national security aides for final decision. A chief goal of the set-up was to reduce the gap that too often existed between the middle level of government where detailed policy was developed, and the top level, where decisions are made. A committee of deputies bridged this gap because its members would be trusted by the top level yet be in a position to communicate easily with the lower level.

In some ways, Scowcroft was able to revive a process that harkened back to the Eisenhower Planning Board, but without its more cumbersome formality.

At the third level of the process were eight (initially, more would be added) Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs). These groups examined and developed policy proposals. Yet the effectiveness of the work undertaken at this level—dubbed National Security Review (NSR) papers—seems mixed, especially those undertaken early in the new administration. According to Richard Haass, who served on the NSC staff during this period, “one of the real weaknesses of the PCC level is that it was periphery-chaired. It’s very hard to have any player be both a player and the referee. The assistant secretary of state comes to the meeting to chair it and to represent the State Department. This puts him in an extremely difficult position.”

During the Clinton presidency (and later under George W. Bush), the policy making structure of the “Scowcroft model” was kept intact: the serious policy work would continue in the principals’ committee, and the deputies’ committee would continue to provide interagency coordination below the principals’ level and serve as the conduit upwards for policy working groups. The latter were now


110. Scowcroft had developed the proposal during the 1988 transition. And unlike the fait accompli for cabinet members that Kissinger’s organizational changes entailed in the 1968 Nixon transition or Brazeinski’s for Carter, Scowcroft circulated his proposal to Baker and Senator John Tower (R-TX), who was then Bush’s nominee for secretary of defense. According to Scowcroft, “I had to convince [Baker] in the beginning because it was new. It hadn’t been done before, and he was wondering whether that cut into his prerogatives. But I convinced him. It was a collegial operation.” Baker had no problems with Scowcroft chairing the principals in the president’s absence. Even though “I was junior to them all,” Scowcroft later recalled, “there wasn’t that kind of problem. It worked beautifully.” (Burke telephone interview with Gen. Brent Scowcroft, November 15, 2007).


112. David Callahan, “Honest Broker: Brent Scowcroft in the Bush White House,” *Foreign Service Journal*, 69 (2, 1992): 31. As Gates would later note, sometimes it was the number three person in the department who was on the committee, since the number two person was usually tasked with managing departmental affairs. Thus Robert Kimmit, the undersecretary of state for political affairs usually attended instead of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, while Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense for policy, attended for Defense rather than Donald J. Atwood, undersecretary of defense (see Rothkopf, *Running the World*, 266-267).

called Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) and were chaired by representatives from either departments, the NSC or the National Economic Council (NEC).  

But there was one important organizational change. In an effort to better deal with international economic issues, a small staff was created in that area and placed under the control of both the NSC advisor and the director of the NEC. In addition, the director of the NEC was made a member of the NSC, and he and his NEC staff were included in meetings involving international economic issues.

Transition Challenge. Interagency coordination has been a perennial problem since the NSC’s creation in 1947. Yet the development of the Scowcroft model offers good news to presidential transitions: it has now survived through three presidencies, and at least organizationally it seems to offer a reasonable template for effective coordination. But much, again, depends on the efforts of the NSC advisor (and the deputy NSC advisor); some have made the model work effectively, others less so. Attention to the third level of the model, the working groups, is one area that requires further analysis. Here the track record is very mixed. Finally, one of the most important activities during the transition is the preparation of a national security directive, signed by the president and usually issued shortly after the inauguration, in which the organization of the national security system is set out and responsibilities assigned.

VII. NSC ADVISOR AND THE NSC STAFF

The size and internal organization of the NSC staff is another matter for the NSC advisor’s attention. There is, again, no statutory guidance here, save for budgetary constraints. Historically, the organization of NSC staff has varied. The problem is compounded by the fact that organizational and personnel issues are critical tasks that must be confronted during the transition.

DEPUTY NSC ADVISOR

With the development of the “Scowcroft model” and the emergence of the deputies’ group as a critical layer of interagency coordination, selection of a deputy NSC advisor has taken on greater importance. That person must possess many of the same skills as an effective NSC advisor, especially in serving as an honest broker in his or her own right. Robert Gates’s tenure under Scowcroft is especially notable in this regard. Gates had the prior background and the personal skills and inclination to make his part of the system work. According to Scowcroft,

[Gates] was very central. The deputies’ committee worked so well because of Bob Gates. Before every meeting, he would come in and say, “Here’s the subject.” And then he would say, “Where do you think we want to end up?” I would say what I thought. He gave everybody their head at the meeting. But in the end, we would have either a decision or a split down clearly defined lines. He was extremely effective. He was terrific.  

According to Philip Zelikow, NSC staff director for European and Soviet affairs at the time, Gates also kept a watchful eye and firm hand on other parts of the process:

What Gates did was to push down the process of initial policy papers and the breaking out of issues so that that occurred as much as possible and in as rigorous as possible way at the assistant secretaries’ level below the deputies’ committee. So by the time you got to the deputies’ meeting with Gates, very often the particular issues were already identified with

some crispness. And then the quality of the analysis on those issues was correspondingly higher and more focused. By the time something would come to the principals, it was defined even better still.116

Gates also managed the NSC staff, freeing Scowcroft up to serve as counselor to the president. According to Zelikow,

[There was] a division of labor between Scowcroft and Gates. Scowcroft is the partner of the president, and he is in effect the White House chief of staff for all foreign matters. . . The real operation of the machine [was] Gates’s job. . . . Gates was the person who had to make the machine really run and stay sharp. It was Gates’s job to get things to Brent’s attention and frame issues so that Brent could operate in the most effective way. One needed the other to reach their full potential, which is often the case. In a good managerial system, you want to hire people to offset your weaknesses, and vice versa. The Scowcroft-Gates combination was an exceptional team in that way.117

The division of labor between the two, of course, was a matter of personal chemistry and how Scowcroft defined his role as NSC advisor; others may work out the particulars differently. But that they were “worked out” is important and instructive.

**INTERNAL ORGANIZATION**

As with the Scowcroft model, the core internal organization of the NSC staff has remained fairly consistent over recent administrations, although with some alterations to reflect differing priorities both across presidencies and within them at different points of time. Geographical subdivisions predominate. To take just one comparison, the Fall 1996 staff under Clinton and Lake and the Spring 2004 staff under G. W. Bush and Rice had the following common units:

- African Affairs
- Asian Affairs
- Inter-American Affairs (Clinton)/Western Hemisphere Affairs (Bush)
- Defense Policy and Arms Control
- Intelligence Programs (Clinton)/Intelligence (Bush)
- Legislative Affairs
- Legal Adviser
- Strategic Planning and Speechwriting (Clinton)/Press and Speechwriting (Bush).

Some geographic units were grouped differently under Clinton:

- Central and Eastern Europe
- European Affairs
- Near East and South Asian Affairs
- Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs

under Bush:

- European and Eurasian Affairs
- Near East and North African Affairs.

Some units were similar but with slightly different emphases:

- Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Clinton)
- Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations (Bush)

Some units reflected the administration’s priorities. In 1996, the Clinton staff had units dealing with

- Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs

By the Fall of 2000, it had additional new staff units dealing with
- South East Europe
- Transnational Threats

By contrast, by 2004, the Bush NSC staff had units dealing with
- Combating Terrorism
- International Economic Affairs
- Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense
- Strategic Planning and Southwest Asia

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Another area for attention is the organizational culture of the NSC staff. The overall aim here is to ensure cooperative relations between the staff and departments—this is matter not just at the level of the principals and NSC advisor, as we saw, but something that should permeate down through their respective organizations.

During the Carter years, according to Madeleine Albright (then on the NSC staff), despite some “we” and “they” tensions between the NSC staff and their counterparts at State, Brzezinski tried hard to foster a unified effort: “I think on the whole there were many staff meetings in which Zbig would make it very clear that he didn’t like the ‘we’ and ‘they’ kind of thing, and I think all of us were aware that certain people were ‘they’.”

During Clinton’s first term, Lake also was aware of and sought to tamp down the traditional us-versus-them tensions within previous administrations were on both their minds and agendas. According to Lake,

I remember more than once telling them [the NSC staff] to avoid the trap. . . both Christopher and I remember this very much from the Carter administration of course. . . .I do remember telling folks at staff meetings, “We must not let this happen.” Christopher and I tried to head it off.

Brzezinski also had another useful practice. Unlike Kissinger, who often kept his staff in the dark and limited their contact with Nixon, Brzezinski held weekly meetings in order to, in his words, “report to the staff in full on my dealings with the president and on presidential business, so that vicariously, if not directly, they have a sense of engagement with a man for whom they are working

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121 As Lake further notes, “Because if it looks like there is a House of York and a House of Lancaster, then reporters will immediately start playing the traditional game of going to folks at the State Department and saying ‘Here’s what the NSC says is happening’ and at the State Department, the testosterone will flow and the State Department officials will on background  say ‘No, here’s what is happening’ and then they will take it back to the NSC staffer and the NSC staffer will fight back, and it gets out of control” (Burke telephone interview with Anthony Lake, November 1, 2007).
so hard.”

According to one NSC staff member, “Zbig wants people to be personally responsible and deeply involved.” Moreover, “He gets the staff people to meet with the president—that was unheard of before.” Brzezinski especially understood the long hours they put in on the job: “I wanted them to feel involved with the President.”

**Transition Challenges:** Particular attention must be paid early to the selection of a deputy NSC advisor who can fit the particulars of that job as it has now evolved into greater importance. The division of labor between the NSC advisor and the deputy must also be clearly factored in. A second major task is attention to the organization of the NSC staff, especially organizational alterations that have bearing on the administration’s policy priorities. A third task is attention to the internal culture and dynamics of the NSC staff. Development of a positive esprit de corps is important, but so too is fostering a sense of cooperation across the administration and a recognition of the role that all play in effective policy development.

**VIII. THE EARLY POLICY AGENDA**

Early efforts to put a new administration’s own mark on policy are common; indeed they are expected. But whether in domestic, economic or in foreign and national security policy, that effort is complicated not just by the difficulty of that task in its own right but by the increasing length of time it now takes to fill sub-cabinet appointments. According to a Brookings Institution study of appointments requiring Senate confirmation, by the end of the first 100 days of the George W. Bush presidency, in nine of fourteen departments, only the cabinet secretary had been confirmed. Out of 500 key sub-cabinet positions, only 29 nominees had been confirmed, compared to 42 at that point for Clinton and 72 under Reagan. By the end of August—with September 11 looming—227 had been confirmed, 41 were announced but the paperwork hadn’t reached the Senate yet, 55 were in the process of Senate confirmation, and 144 positions remained unfilled. When the Brookings study was complete, it concluded that it took, *on average*, 8.7 months for the Bush administration to move its nominees through Senate confirmation, compared to 8.3 months in the Clinton presidency and 5.2 under Reagan.

It is not likely the timetable will change in 2009. In fact, the trend indicates that even more time will be needed. Clearly, efforts to make sub-cabinet appointments in key agenda areas should be a prime area of concern. Special attention must also be given to devising a balanced personnel process. Too little control by the transition team, as occurred with Carter in 1976, can lead to the cabinet secretaries’ domination of the selection process, with later repercussions to the White House’s agenda. Too much transition control can lead to organizational weakness within a department as a cabinet member operates in an alien and perhaps hostile environment. Perhaps the right balance can begin to be found in the operational code of George W. Bush’s 2000 transition. Their aim, according to personnel director Clay Johnson, was “Do it with them, not to them.”

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Likewise, and maybe even more importantly, early selection of an NSC advisor is critical. He or she will have a major impact in selecting NSC staff personnel, but without facing the impediment of Senate confirmation. The sooner people are in place, the sooner they can function effectively in their jobs, and the sooner they can turn attention to the new administration’s substantive agenda.

Still, the task at hand is daunting. Past efforts to undertake an early review of policy and to engage in a major effort at policy planning have been mixed at best. A largely NSC staff-directed seems the best course in any case, although departmental “buy in” to the effort and its results is also needed. If the organizational structure mandates department-led efforts, the team of political appointees charged with that undertaking at State, Defense or elsewhere may still be thin or, even if confirmed, encumbered with the tasks of learning their basic departmental responsibilities.

The 1988-89 George H.W. Bush transition experience is especially instructive. Here was a president with deep foreign policy interests and experience, working with a foreign policy team that had them as well. In Scowcroft’s view, these efforts at long range planning were important but difficult to achieve in practice: “I always thought that the NSC, as the agent of the president, ought to have a long-range planning function. I tried it both times and it never worked satisfactorily. Either nobody had time to pay attention to it or you had to grab them when a fire broke out. That was one of the most frustrating things to me. Nobody else is in a position to do the broad, long-range thinking that the NSC is, but I don’t know how you do it.”

In Secretary of State Baker’s view, these early policy reviews in 1989 were handicapped by the fact that many Bush sub-cabinet appointees were still not in place and, as a result, Reagan holdovers—more averse to examining their own policies—played a major role. According to Baker, the existing bureaucracy produced the papers, rather than fresh sources who did not have a vested interest in existing policy. The result was “least-common-denominator thinking, with every potentially controversial—that is, interesting—idea left out in the name of bureaucratic consensus. In the end, what we received was mush.”

Yet Scowcroft was organizationally astute and adaptive. NSR-3, on policy toward the Soviet Union, came before Bush in mid-March 1989, but it yielded no major changes from the Reagan years and was characterized as “status-quo plus.” According to Scowcroft, “it was disappointing... short on detail and substance,” and lacked “imaginative initiatives.” In its place, Scowcroft asked Condoleezza Rice to draft an alternative think piece, which was much better in Scowcroft’s view and evolved into a new approach for dealing with Gorbachev. NSR-12, on basic national security policy, suffered delay, and by May 1989 only sections of an early draft had been produced, and Scowcroft even felt they were inadequate. Slow work ran against the deadline for a NATO summit meeting, and Scowcroft himself took the lead in fashioning a conventional arms reduction proposal for the meeting, an initiative that was warmly greeted by the NATO allies and would lead to a conventional forces treaty with the Soviet Union that was much to U.S. advantage.

Long range planning also bears on crisis decision making. It is obviously not crisis decision making per se. However, as President Eisenhower recognized from his own military experience, continued attention to planning facilitates an adept and effective response to immediate crisis. In a paper produced by Cutler in March 1968 and circulated to Eisenhower, the former president noted in the margins that “through this practice [of continuous planning], the members of the NSC became familiar not only with each other but with the basic factors of problems that might, on some future date, face the president.” Furthermore, as Cutler notes in the paper, “Thus in time of sudden, explosive crisis, these men would gather to work with and for the president, not as strangers, but as men intimately made familiar, through continuing association with the character, abilities, and

129. Daalder and Destler, eds., “The Role of the National Security Adviser,” 20; also see Rothkopf, Running the World, 273-274.
130. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 68.
131. Prados, Keeper of the Keys, 549.
133. Prados, Keeper of the Keys, 549-550.
understandings of each colleague at the Council table. Such training and familiarity enabled them to act in an emergency, not as ciphers and not as yes-men for the president, but as men accustomed to express their own views.

That many new administrations have faced early crises should also be factored in and prepared for. Some are of the new administration’s own making, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion for JFK. Others come from external threats, such as September 11. Some are carried over from the previous administration, but through neglect or policy drift emerge as major challenges: the humanitarian mission to Somalia in the late days of the Bush Sr. presidency that morphed, under Clinton, into a military effort against its warlords, with eventual consequences in the loss of U.S. lives on the streets of Mogadishu.

The aftermath of crises is also noteworthy. For Kennedy, they generated a degree of learning behavior that made him a better decision maker. For other presidents, the opportunity for change goes unrecognized. The Gulf of Tonkin attacks, for example, failed to serve as a warning sign to Lyndon Johnson about the intelligence he was receiving, and they prompted no reconsideration of a troubled decision making process that in less than a year would lead to a major military commitment in Vietnam.

### Transition Challenges

Transitions need to move quickly in selecting key appointees in order to get their agenda off of the ground. Early selection of an NSC advisor is just as important as early selection of a chief of staff. Both play central if not determining roles in how their respective staff organizations are structured and operate, as well as selecting key personnel within them. NSC staff is in a better position to undertake the lead on any broad policy planning reviews; top layers of departments and agencies are likely to be skeletal for considerable time. But new presidencies also must be aware of the difficulties of such an undertaking; departments must eventually “buy in.” Finally, the possibility of early crises must be prepared for. In their aftermath, stock must be taken and lessons learned.

### IX. Taking Stock of Post-9/11 Organizational Changes

An historically unique challenge in the 2008-2009 transition will be taking into account the organizational changes that have occurred in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. As an April 2008 report by the Congressional Research Service notes,

> These organizations have not undergone a presidential transition and may see many political appointees depart federal government service prior to the inauguration of the next President. Also, the organizations that existed during the last presidential transition and the new agencies may have employed many new personnel who are not well-versed in addressing matters of national security during times of presidential transition. Additionally,

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134. R. C. Cutler, “The Use of the NSC Mechanism: Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon,” March 1968, Gordon Gray Papers, Eisenhower Library. In the margins of the document, Eisenhower also noted that “there were many split views brought forth at the NSC.” Furthermore, as Cutler notes, in his memoirs, even more important than “what is planned is that the planners become accustomed to working and thinking together on hard problems; enabling them—when put to the ultimate test—to arrive more surely at a reasonable plan or policy” (Cutler, No Time for Rest, 296-97, emphasis in original). Similar points are also made in his final report to the president at the end of his first stint as NSC adviser in April 1955: “Every so often history takes charge. Then there is no time for papers to be properly staffed through the Planning Board and decisions must flow from oral discussion. That Council members have been trained in the customary Council procedure serves to condition them for crash problems which must be decided without the usual background material,” (Robert Cutler, “Report to the President: Operations of the National Security Council, January 1953-April 1955,” April 1, 1955, White House Office, Office of Special Assistant for National Security, Special Assistant Series, Chronological Subseries, Eisenhower Library). Brownell also makes the same point about the impact on crisis management. Members of the team “became accustomed to working with each other.” Prior planning “enabled those persons involved in the policy process to draw on knowledge and information acquired earlier that would be useful in responding to any immediate and pressing crises at hand” (Brownell, Advising Ike, 293).
organizations that pre-date the attacks of September 11, 2001, and that previously had national security responsibilities, may be asked to devote additional attention and resources to presidential transition-related issues. Based on the length of time between the previous presidential transition, the departure of senior political and career officials, and the influx of new personnel addressing national security issues, it is possible that some federal agencies may not be properly anticipating the attention required or resources needed to support the incoming Administration’s preparation and policy familiarization efforts. Some security observers contend that if proper planning has not occurred, efforts to support the incoming Administration may require personnel and resources to be transferred. This reallocation could detract from ongoing national security related activities and possibly place the nation at risk.135

Jamie Gorelick and Slade Gorton—two members of the 9/11 commission—particularly point to early transition efforts in these areas, even pre-dating the November election. In their view, attention must be given to:

- provision to the candidates before Election Day of full information regarding national intelligence programs and practices, beyond the intelligence briefings that presidential candidates are currently provided
- early selection and vetting of key national security officials, even before election day so that time is not wasted in the post-election period
- a change in media and public culture that would allow candidates to vet nominees before election day
- early meetings of prospective appointees with their counterparts in the outgoing administration136

Although their recommendations apply broadly to national security, homeland security, and intelligence officials, they are relevant to the transition to office of a new NSC advisor and staff.

Transition Challenges: For presidential transitions, there is no historical precedent, to draw upon for insight, for the changed organizational context in the aftermath of 9/11. Nor is there one fraught with such a heavy degree of uncertainty and future danger. The war against terror must figure as central in the calculus of all of those involved, during the transition, in the areas of homeland and national security policy. Indeed, effective integration of homeland security and national security policy is now a new—and vitally consequential--factor in the effectiveness of presidential transitions.

X: FINAL POINTS

I offer no grand finale. Just two quotations—perhaps a closing pas de deux, if you will—to ponder from our foundational NSC staff-system president, Dwight D. Eisenhower. The first from his memoirs:

Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent; even less can it, of itself, make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can lead to disaster. Organization makes more efficient the gathering and analysis of facts, and the arranging of the findings of experts in logical fashion. Therefore organization helps the responsible individual make the necessary decision, and helps assure that it is satisfactorily carried out.137

137. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, 114.
The second comes from a Columbia University oral history in 1967:

I have been forced to make decisions, some of them of a critical character, for a good many years. And I know of only one way in which you can be sure you’ve done your best to make a wise decision. That is to get all of the people who have partial and definable responsibility in this particular field, whatever it be. Get them with their different viewpoints in front of you, and listen to them debate. I do not believe in bringing them in one at a time, and therefore being more impressed by the most recent one you hear rather than the earlier ones. You must get courageous men, men of strong views, and let them debate and argue with each other. You listen, and you see if there’s anything brought up, an idea that changes your own view or enriches or adds to it. Sometimes the case becomes so simple that you can make a decision right then. Or you may go back and wait two or three weeks, if time isn’t of the essence. But you make it.\footnote{Quoted in Fred I. Greenstein, \textit{The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader}, New York: Basic Books, 1982, 246.}

On both accounts, however, it is important to remember that the president does not stand alone: an effective NSC advisor and staff can make a wealth of positive difference.
LIST OF NSC ADVISORS\textsuperscript{139}
Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs
1953-2008

Stephen Hadley: January 26, 2005 –
Condoleezza Rice: January 22, 2001 - January 25, 2005
Samuel R. Berger: March 14, 1997 - January 20, 2001
Anthony Lake: January 20, 1993 - March 14, 1997
Brent Scowcroft: January 20, 1989 - January 20, 1993
John M. Poindexter: December 4, 1985 - November 25, 1986
Robert C. McFarlane: October 17, 1983 - December 4, 1985
William P. Clark: January 4, 1982 - October 17, 1983
Brent Scowcroft: November 3, 1975 - January 20, 1977
Henry A. Kissinger: December 2, 1968 - November 3, 1975\textsuperscript{140}
Walt W. Rostow: April 1, 1966 - December 2, 1968
McGeorge Bundy: January 20, 1961 - February 28, 1966
Gordon Gray: June 24, 1958 - January 13, 1961
Robert Cutler: January 7, 1957 - June 24, 1958
Dillon Anderson: April 2, 1955 - September 1, 1956
Robert Cutler: March 23, 1953 - April 2, 1955

\textsuperscript{139} National Security Council, “History of the National Security Council,” www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html
\textsuperscript{140} Served concurrently as Secretary of State from September 21, 1973.
At this time, few in the public and private policy apparatus have anything like the substantial information resources necessary to understand the appointments process, to balance the tension between nominees, those charged with governing, and those charged with protecting them. While many have opinions about reforming the process, few have taken into account all of the forces involved and few have the information resources at their command to find useful, finely tuned reforms.

In the academic community, some research has focused on the confirmation side of the appointments process but its data resources suffer from having only a partial view of the process and, hence, cannot easily assign the right weights to the various forces involved (see McCarty and Razaghian).

Those interested in reform can avail themselves of three useful resources, however. First, the White House Transition Project maintains an analytic capacity associated with its Nomination Forms Online software program. Intended to further the development of useful software to assist nominees, WHTP archives hold a detailed assessment of nominee inquiries. Its website, whitehousetransitionproject.org, contains many of these reports.

Second, the Department of Agriculture maintains a substantial resource in its programming unit, capable of bringing considerable expertise to bear on any project to assist nominees in filing out forms.

Finally, the collective experiences of White House Counsels and White House Directors of Presidential Personnel provide a useful compendium of observations on the demands of the personnel system. Many of these observations appear in the briefing books on these two office developed in 2000 by the White House Transition Project and available through its website, whitehousetransitionproject.org and its publication The White House World.
WHAT WHTP DOES

The White House Transition Project unites the efforts of academic institutions with those of the policy community and private philanthropy into a consortium dedicated to smoothing the transfer of governing essential to a functioning American republic. It manages two related program, one on institutional memory and best practices and one on presidential appointments. In both programs, the White House Transition Project brings to bear the considerable analytic resources of the world-wide academic community interested in the viability of democratic institutions on those problems identified as critical by those experienced hands who have held the unique responsibilities for governing. As such, the White House Transition Project brings ideas to bear on action.

The White House Interview Program

A common problem of the democratic transfer of power, the White House has no mechanism for maintaining an “institutional memory” of best practices, of common mistakes, and needed background information. Partisanship and growing complexity of the selection process exacerbate the natural tendency to avoid passing from one administration to the next the vital experiences necessary to carry on governing from one administration to the next. The lack of an institutional memory, then, literally turns the hallmark of the American constitutional system, its peaceful transfer of power, into a breathe-taking gamble. The White House Interview Program bridges the gaps between partisanship and experience by providing a conduit for those who have borne the extraordinary responsibilities to pass on their judgments to those who will enter the American nerve center. Its briefing materials compile these lessons from the practitioners with the long-view of academics familiar with executive organizations and operational dynamics. Provided to the transition planners for the national presidential campaigns and then to the president-elect’s newly appointed management team, these materials provide a range of useful perspectives from those who have held the same positions and faced the same problems that they cannot get on their own or from government resources.

Nomination Forms Online Program

Detailing the complex problems involved in nominating and then confirming presidential appointments, the WHTP’s Nomination Forms Online program provides the best available expertise on the nomination and confirmation process. Its software, NFO, constitutes the only fully-functional, open-architecture, completely reusable software for making sense of the morass of government questions that assail presidential nominees. In one place, this software presents nominees with all of the some 6,000 questions they may confront. Provided free as a public service by WHTP, NFO prompts nominees for needed information and then distributes and customizes answers to all of the forms and into all the questions that the nominee must answer on a subject.

HOW TO HELP SMOOTH THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION

Originally funded by grants from the Pew Charitable Trusts, WHTP manages its operations with the help of private philanthropy. To assist in that effort, please contact WHTP at WHTP@unc.edu.