Undertaken by presidency scholars and funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the White House Interview Program provides information to incoming presidential staff on White House transitions and operations. See http://whitehouse2001.org for more information.
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Lessons From Past Presidential Transitions
Organization, Management, and Decision Making

John P. Burke, University of Vermont1

In addition to careful and early consideration of the key positions on the White House staff and other appointments that Martha Joynt Kumar, George Edwards, James Pfiffner and Terry Sullivan recommend in their piece “Meeting the Freight Train Head On”, transitions are also a time when presidents-to-be and their advisers need to think about how the pieces fit together into a larger whole.2 Part of that effort involves crafting the decision-making processes and the various channels of information and advice that, once in office, presidents will need to utilize in making policy choices. Another piece entails the marketing and selling of those policy proposals to the public and the Congress, and otherwise bringing them to successful fruition. Still another are the management tasks that are associated with policy making and implementation. How are the skills and talents of a diverse range of actors--some of whom may be newcomers not just to the White House or the executive branch but to Washington itself--successfully brought together and coordinated? How is a sense of teamwork and commitment instilled and conflict and tension avoided?

Common Elements

Beginning with the Carter effort in 1976, the four transitions that have occurred to date share common elements:

- Transition planning activities undertaken before the November election
- Organization of a post-election transition
- Creation of teams directed at policy planning and the crafting of a presidential agenda
- Establishment of groups concerned with gathering information on particular agencies and departments
- Attention to cabinet and sub-cabinet appointments
- Appointing and shaping a White House staff

1. This article draws, in part, on my longer study of presidential transitions; see John P. Burke, Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) www.rienner.com.
Yet there has also been significant variation in how each of these transitions went about these tasks, which received more emphasis than others, and what was accomplished successfully and what was not.

**Planning for Decision Making and Policy Outcomes as a Key Goal**

Perhaps most significant in differentiating successful from unsuccessful transitions is the degree to which these tasks were recognized as contributors to presidential decision making and the formulation of successful policy outcomes. In the 1992 Clinton transition, for example, cabinet appointments quickly became a major preoccupation to the detriment of selecting a White House staff and figuring out how it would be organized. Clinton would not settle on the appointment of his chief of staff until mid-December, and a number of top staff members were not selected until a week before inauguration day. In the absence of staff personnel decisions, little could be done to figure out how “people” could be organized into an effective “process” that could flesh out campaign promises into concrete and politically feasible policy proposals. Not surprisingly, a number of policy missteps emerged that would affect this administration once in office: the handling of the gays in the military proposal, lax vetting of some nominees, and a perception that Clinton was willing to cave-in too easily to a variety of constituency groups, thus calling into question his commitment as a “New Democrat.”

But Bill Clinton does not stand alone in his troubles. Jimmy Carter wanted a leaner, more collegial White House staff than had been the case during the Nixon years, plus a more significant role for his cabinet. Yet during his transition, little effort was made to plan for how those hopes might operate in practice. As a result, Carter ended up with a staff that became compartmentalized rather than collegial, a cabinet that never functioned effectively as a group, and he found himself overburdened in policy detail.

George Bush’s broader experience placed him in a better position than “political outsiders” like Clinton and Carter in making personnel choices. Yet Bush’s transition efforts would likewise sometimes backfire. Although some of his key assistants were appointed early on, the selection of the presidential assistant for domestic and economic policy was not made until early January and some of the units that were central to the marketing and selling of the administration’s proposals (the White House political affairs, public liaison, and intergovernmental affairs offices) were placed at lower organizational levels in the White House staff than had been the case under his predecessors.

For Ronald Reagan, the transition provided a clearer recognition of the organizational needs that would fit with his style as a decision maker as well as more attention to decision-making processes. But it also crafted a process that left Reagan largely uninvolved in the early stages of policy formulation, and demanded a high degree of trust and cooperation among those to whom much had been delegated (Ed Meese, Jim Baker and Michael Deaver most notably).

**Some Bright Spots**

Each of these transitions also provide positive legacies. Carter recognized, as none of his predecessors had to date, the complexity of the transition process and the scope of activities now required for that effort. What his transition broadly undertook in 1976 would set the parameters of the task for his successors. Reagan’s 1980 effort illustrates the importance of a clear policy agenda, commitment to that agenda, and the creation of processes that would secure that agenda. George Bush was skilled in selecting associates who...
were personally loyal to him and, in some cases through Bush’s own efforts years earlier, had acquired the Washington political and policy expertise that would make their own transition to new positions much smoother. For Bill Clinton, the 1992 transition saw the creation of the National Economic Council (NEC) and the appointment of an experienced economic team--Lloyd Bentsen at Treasury, Leon Panetta and Alice Rivlin at the OMB, and Robert Rubin at the NEC—who would prove critical in getting the administration to address the difficult economic issues before him, especially mounting budget deficits.

**I. THE SEEDS FOR A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION ARE SOWN EARLY**

The 1976 transition is especially notable for the fact that Carter began transition planning well before election day--indeed initial steps were taken shortly after his victory in the Pennsylvania primary with a major effort commencing after the Democratic party convention. Carter’s successors have all followed this practice, although with some important variations. But whatever their particular efforts before the first Tuesday in November, what is accomplished during this period directly bears not only on how quickly the actual transition is up and running after election day but also on how smoothly and effectively it will operate. As Leon Panetta observes: “The sooner you start this process the better off you are in hitting the ground running if you’re elected, as opposed to starting from scratch.”

**TOO LITTLE TIME LATER ON**

The post-election period of the transition simply allows too little time to get up to speed in dealing with the hurdles that will be faced in making appointments (financial disclosure requirements and FBI background checks), setting up the physical logistics of the post-election transition (office space, equipment, and the possible division of labor between operations in Washington and the president-elect’s home base), as well as decisions about top-level appointees that are normally expected soon after election day.

As Andrew Card, who was a participant in the in-coming 1988 Bush transition and then headed its out-going transition in 1992, recalls:

> I think that it’s critical to have someone thinking about personnel, but it’s more important that that person or someone think about the process for personnel because it’s the process that gets you into trouble.

Card especially counseled the Clinton team in 1992 that,

> it was going to take them twice as long as they realized to get people completed with their background checks and their financial checks and everything else and that they should start soonest on doing that.

A pre-election that is on track on personnel--both in planning an appointments process and in preparing for the variety of legal hurdles to be faced--will be of inestimable value to a speedy and effective post-election effort.

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Lessons From Past Presidential Transitions

**Transition Planners Versus Campaign Staff**

The practice for all of the transitions from 1976 on has been to separate any transition planning before election day from the operations of the campaign. The conventional wisdom is that the campaign must remain focused on the immediate task at hand rather than become preoccupied with planning for an administration that may not come to be. Moreover, this separation has not only been organizational but also geographical: Carter and Clinton located their transition staffs in different buildings than those housing their campaign staffs, Bush’s operation was run out of offices at the Republican National Committee, and Reagan’s transition team was housed in Alexandria, Virginia while his campaign staff was in nearby Arlington.

Yet even when organizationally and physically separate, tensions between the campaign staff and the transition effort have often still erupted and they present an important management challenge that needs to be addressed during the pre-election period. While integration of the two groups may be unwise, steps still need to be taken to smooth relations between them, provide a degree of coordination, establish linkages and lines of communication, and engage in on-going oversight of the transition group’s activities. The stakes are clear. As Harrison Wellford explains, the emergence of “conflicts, rivalries, and jealousies” can mean “that even when good work was done, it failed to find the audience that it was supposed to find because it became hostage to all these internal conflicts.”

**Developing Trust: Leadership, Respect, and Communication**

One difference among the four recent transitions is the degree of trust that exists between the campaign staff and the pre-election transition group, particularly its leadership. In 1976, Carter’s choice of Jack Watson to head his transition operation quickly generated concerns among the campaign team that Hamilton Jordan headed and it was to spill over into the post-election period. Watson may have indeed been the best person for the job, but little was done to alleviate the fears of Carter’s campaign staff that they were being cut out of planning for the new administration (and, of course, possible jobs), nor were clear signals sent as to why Watson’s efforts were needed and why they being conducted apart from the campaign. As Landon Butler, one of Jordan’s campaign deputies, recalls:

> It resulted in some bad blood because there [was] sort of the feeling that we won the campaign and now we’re going to turn it over to the smart people. It was bitter. It was very bitter at the time and that didn’t go well.

Communication was also an issue in 1976. In the view of Stu Eizenstat, who directed the Carter campaign’s policy planning effort, the pre-election transition group:

> was sort of a fifth wheel in the sense that it was out there but none of us in the campaign had any control over it. It was doing its own thing without any central direction and without any relationship to what was happening in the campaign. And this was later to make the transition a very strained and difficult transition.

(Stuart Eizenstat, Miller Center Oral History, p. 14, Carter Library.)

The broader scope of the transition group’s mandate was another factor that generated concerns among the campaign staffs in 1976 and 1992. Not only may there be a sense that future jobs might be lost, there could be the perception that a new group of actors who had not participated in the long battles and skirmishes of the campaign are now poised to hijack a presidency. As Rick Hucheson, a deputy campaign director in 1976, complained in a long memo to Hamilton Jordan, the campaign’s director, Carter’s campaign pledges would likely “go out the window” with “a new crew of policy experts” coming in. (Memorandum

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Lessons From Past Presidential Transitions

In 1980, by contrast, campaign director Edwin Meese selected Pendleton James, a personnel specialist who had worked in the Nixon White House, to head the Reagan effort and several longtime Reagan aides, Helene von Damm most notably, were placed in his operation thus potentially stilling any fears among the campaign staff that their future interests might be neglected.

Similar patterns re-emerged in 1988 and 1992. In 1988, George Bush appointed a longtime member of his inner circle, Chase Untermeyer, to head his operation. In 1992, however, Bill Clinton selected Mickey Kantor for his pre-election effort, and it was a choice, as in 1976, that did not sit well with the campaign war room. Next to the selection of a running mate, the person the presidential candidate chooses to head any transition planning operation will be the most important and consequential personnel decision that will be made until election day.

More generally, in Harrison Wellford’s view, “you need to choose people in those jobs [campaign staff and transition planners] who have mutual respect and recognize the importance of both functions and try to keep the tension from developing by having information flow back and forth.” A perception that a candidate is measuring the White House drapes before election day is a political liability, thus the tendency for secrecy about transition planning. But too great an effort to keep the transition operation “hermetically sealed off from everybody else” can leave “key campaign people [feeling] that they were not involved.”

Oversight

Oversight of the activities of the pre-election transition operation is also a crucial part of the management task. In 1980, Ed Meese, who was director of the campaign, met almost daily with James. In 1988, George Bush, Jim Baker and John Sununu held frequent meetings with Untermeyer. In both of these instances, informal linkage to the campaign was clearly established either by a key player in the campaign’s operation (Meese) or at the highest levels in the case of Bush and his advisers. In 1976 and 1992, by contrast, oversight and linkage to the campaign were more tenuous. The day after his election, for example, Bill Clinton was reportedly surprised to find out that his campaign staff was upset and angry with Kantor’s efforts in the preceding months. Furthermore, in both 1976 and 1992, internal struggles that had been festering broke out, delaying the business of the transition.

In Harrison Wellford’s view, “A lot of it is the tone set by candidate himself.” Another remedy, in his view, is (as Meese was in 1980) to make the campaign chief “very involved in setting up the planning committee...and making it clear that he has confidence in the people that are doing the planning and sees himself as one of the reviewers of the information before it goes to the president-elect.”

from Rick [Hutcheson] to Hamilton [Jordan], September 30, 1976, “Some Political Aspects of the Transition,” Staff Secretary Files-Hutcheson, Box 249, Carter Library.)

7. Other contributors to a successful pre-election transition are organization and a sense of shared mission. As Harrison Wellford explains, in contrast to the Carter effort in 1976, in the Reagan pre-election planning four years earlier:

[They] were assembling key teams that did form the backbone of the transition effort well before the election and the hierarchies between them were pretty well set...for the most part they were well organized, had a pretty good idea of what Reagan’s needs were going to be and were ready to go after election night.


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**How Much Pre-Election Planning Is Enough?**

The Reagan and Bush efforts also differed from those of Carter and Clinton in the scope of their efforts. Pre-election planning in 1980 and 1988 was largely limited to planning a personnel operation and determining what steps needed to be taken after election day, while in 1976 and 1992 the mandate was more broadly drawn to include not just personnel but policy planning, White House staffing and organization, and a range of matters relating to the agenda of the new administration and its first months in office. “Friendly take-overs,” especially by sitting vice presidents, will make the transition easier and the scope of the pre-election effort will likely be more limited. But the Reagan 1980 pre-election effort is also instructive: a party turnover but without the more elaborate efforts of 1976 and 1992.

**Informal Decisions, At the Top**

The Reagan pre-election effort in 1980 was not bereft of early planning in some of these areas. Rather the difference is that they occurred within the inner circle of the candidate and his advisers, not in some separate operation from which the campaign staff might have felt alienated. In 1980, Reagan and his advisers had begun to think about key positions, such as chief of staff, before election day, and they also benefited from a number of task forces, tied to the campaign rather than the transition, that had begun the process of defining policy choices.

One lesson that might be drawn here is that while a pre-election transition operation may be needed, transition planning during this period need not be restricted to those formally charged with it. The presidential candidate and his or her inner circle must begin the staffing and organization process even before election returns are in. At a minimum, in David Gergen’s experience:

> Given the fact that the transition is only eleven weeks long--it’s so compressed--you have to get as much done as possible before the transition starts and not wait for the transition. Unless you prepare well for the transition, you’re going to find it much more difficult.  

**The Advantages of “Friendly Take-overs”**

Potential transfers in the presidency that do not involve a change in party are obviously in a more advantageous position in the pre-election period, and this is especially the case if it is a sitting vice president who is the party’s nominee. There will presumably be greater familiarity with the internal dynamics of the presidency, particularly the operations of the White House staff and the demands and complexities of presidential decision making. Plus, there is higher probability that the nominee will be in a position to make quicker decisions on key appointments.

Before election day in 1988, for example, George Bush had not only settled on James Baker as his secretary of state—a choice that was announced the day after the election at his first press conference—but he also determined that Chase Untermeyer would direct the post-election personnel operation and head up the White House personnel unit. So too with his legal counsel, C. Boyden Gray: Gray was quickly tapped not only to head up the transition’s legal unit but also to serve as White House legal counsel come inauguration.

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The early appointments of Untermeyer and Gray to these positions were not only unprecedented—they too were announced the day after the election—but they provided a degree of continuity that was critical to the personnel appointment process during the transition and thereafter. As Untermeyer observes:

Boyden and I were named because we were linked together in the entire business of putting together the administration. That's why we were among the first to be named.10

Bush’s 1988 transition also benefited from close cooperation with the outgoing Reagan administration even before election day. Untermeyer met on some half dozen occasions with Robert Tuttle of the White House personnel office. Untermeyer would later recall that his meetings with Tuttle were “extremely valuable,” and the material Tuttle provided “became the hour-by-hour bosom companion of my own personnel staff after the election.” Moreover, according to Untermeyer, “none of this was available to my counterpart in the Dukakis campaign, nor could it have been.” “In a normal transition of one party to the other, all that would have been delayed until the actual [post-election] transition, and even then it would have been shared grudgingly at best.”11

II. UP AND RUNNING AFTER ELECTION DAY:
ORGANIZING AND MANAGING FOR A NEW PRESIDENCY

As Kumar, Edwards, Pfiffner and Sullivan have rightly noted, presidents-elect must move quickly on key staff appointments following the election. Not only does this still speculation (and also an element of internal competition) about who will be appointed, it also permits those new appointees to move with dispatch in organizing their own staffs and otherwise acquiring the information and expertise needed to “come up to speed” through contacts with their predecessors and with their opposite numbers in the incumbent administration. In 1992, although Clinton had broached the possibility of serving as his chief of staff to Mack McLarty shortly after the election, it was not until mid-December that the appointment was announced. McLarty was able to contact some of his predecessors as chief of staff. But the delay left him less time in assembling a White House staff, and the staff, in turn, had little time to prepare for the task ahead.

QUICK MOVEMENT ON THE TRANSITION’S ORGANIZATION

The post-election transition continues to pose management tasks. One is the degree to which the president-elect is ready to move quickly in putting in place a post-election transition operation. Again pre-election planning will figure significantly in that effort. In 1988, although his mandate was quite limited, Untermeyer prepared a lengthy memo for Bush on the steps that needed to be taken and Bush immediately took action. So too had Jack Watson in 1976. But the tensions between Watson’s operation and Hamilton Jordan’s campaign team spilled over after the election and there was almost a two-week delay before the transition’s organization was fully worked out. Carter was reportedly irritated at the squabbling among his lieutenants, but he provided little personal guidance, preferring instead that they work differences out

10. White House Interview Program, Interview with Chase Untermeyer, Martha Joynt Kumar, Houston, TX., July 6, 1999.
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amongst themselves. The whole episode proved costly and, in the interim, valuable time had been lost. According to one staff member, “basically nothing was happening.”

A transition operation that is clearly in place shortly after election day presents a number of obvious benefits to a successful transition. In 1980, for example, not only was James Baker’s appointment as chief of staff settled early, Baker was designated as deputy director of the transition and placed in charge of White House planning on November 6, two days after the election. Baker not only had ample time to prepare for the task ahead but also the organizational authority and a clear mandate to do so.

Having a transition operation in place also permits the appointments operation to commence, which, in turn, has a number of advantages. It may help dampen the uncertainties of those involved in the campaign or transition eager to learn about their jobs in the new administration. The earlier top layers of the administration are filled, moreover, the sooner second- and third-level staff positions can be determined. Early appointment also extends the time frame in which the official-designate can begin to get a handle on the new position.

CONTINUITY IN TRANSITION LEADERSHIP?

Like the early designations of Untermeyer and Gray in 1988, Baker's appointment and mandate in 1980 is indicative of the benefits of making early decisions on key appointments and providing an element of continuity between the transition and the new administration. Yet, interestingly, an element of continuity has often been more difficult to achieve between the pre- and post-election leadership of the transition. In 1988, while George Bush had slotted Untermeyer to direct personnel matters, the post-election operation was co-directed by Craig Fuller, his vice-presidential chief of staff, and Robert Teeter, one of his chief campaign strategists. In 1992, Clinton passed over Mickey Kantor in favor of Vernon Jordan and Warren Christopher. In 1976, while Watson would emerge as the transition’s “coordinator,” a number of important functions (including personnel and “political coordination”) were assigned to Hamilton Jordan, as well as a separate communications operation that was under the direction of press secretary Jody Powell. Only in 1980, when Ed Meese oversaw the pre-election effort and then served as director of the post-election effort, do we find one person who retained a central role in both the pre- and post-election periods.

While continuity may be advisable, it may not be a necessary requirement for a successful transition. Bush’s post-election appointment of Fuller and Teeter indicates that presidents-elect can safely switch horses in mid-stream; indeed, given Untermeyer’s limited mandate from the start that may have been the intent. But if the aim is to have a more limited operation before election day and then proceed more vigorously thereafter, decisions about who will head the transition will need to be made quickly. The roughly seventy-five days on average until inauguration day leaves little time for delay or indecision.

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSITION LEADERS WHO MAY END UP IN THE CABINET

Clinton’s appointment of Warren Christopher to co-direct his transition’s post-election operation presents another important lesson about continuity, now within the transition itself. In Christopher’s case, it

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raises the issue of entrusting transition responsibilities to someone who then is nominated to a cabinet-level position. As Warren Christopher himself would later note, following his mid-December nomination as secretary of state, “I began to shift gears to preparing to assume leadership of the State Department.” In fact, Clinton would face a double-whammy in this regard: the person charged with heading up the transition’s personnel operation, former Governor Richard Riley of South Carolina, also was appointed to a cabinet position, secretary of education. According to one 1992 transition member: “The personnel process was a complete mess” once Riley was tapped for the cabinet; “it was just chaos...there were no real people with experience running it.”

“BELTWAY” IF NOT PRIOR WHITE HOUSE EXPERIENCE ESPECIALLY HELP

Another element of a successful transition is enlisting the services of those with Washington if not prior White House experience, not just at the top but throughout the transition organization. This presents an obvious challenge to those presidents-elect who do not have prior Washington experience, but it is not insurmountable. Ronald Reagan, while a political “outsider,” could benefit from the services of those who had served in the Nixon and Ford administrations. As Harrison Wellford explains, “they knew how things worked. They were highly professional people. As a result from day one with Reagan there was a discipline and order to the process.” But the Carter and Clinton experiences were different:

Carter came in after years of Republican rule and put together an ad hoc team the way you do with very few people with much experience...the people actually making the decisions were people out of state government for the most part or out of the campaign who had no experience in national life at all....

As Wellford had summed up earlier, “Clinton was much the same way....So you had a sense of amateur hour with Clinton.”

In 1992, in the view of Leon Panetta:

When it came to the White House staff it was almost like, my goodness, we're at inauguration day, we better bring in a lot of people who worked in the campaign. You cannot do that....They’ve got to know how the White House operates. You have to have grown-ups.

BUT LOYALTY AND PRIOR ASSOCIATION ALSO COUNT: THE KEY IS TO BLEND

While Washington experience may help, personal loyalty and familiarity with the new president are also of great benefit. As David Gergen explains, the ability to blend the two were key to the success of the early Reagan presidency:

14. Burke interview with 1992 transition official
16. Panetta goes on to note: “You can't just have a bunch of campaign types come in. By grown-ups I mean people that have experience, that have been around, that bring a level of stability and management to the operation so that you have a disciplined operation. Campaigns by their nature can be undisciplined. People go out and operate on their own. They're doing a lot of stuff on their own. But when you go in to the White House, the amount of focus, the amount of attention that's made, you absolutely have to have a disciplined operation on your hands. That's not easy to do with campaign types.” White House Interview Program, Interview with Leon Panetta, Martha Joynt Kumar, Monterey Bay, California, May 3, 2000.
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The success of the Reagan blend was he brought some people with him who knew him well and were extremely loyal to both his program and to his philosophy and to the man, all of whom were newcomers to Washington....But he blended that with a team of experienced Washington insiders who didn't know the man as well but knew Washington well.

So too with some of the campaign staff in Gergen’s view:

There’s a tendency on the policy side... [to] keep all those campaigners out of there...but the campaign people know what the candidate said, they know the mood of the candidate, they know how the policy issues evolved in the campaign. Most of all, they know the guy.\textsuperscript{17}

\section*{III. The Advantages of Timeliness}

\subsection*{Having Your Own People in Place}

Timeliness in organizing the transition especially affects the ability of the new administration to have its people in place in agencies and departments come inauguration day. This is especially needed when there is an inter-party transfer of power, and at least one high-level appointee of the new administration needs to be in place on January 20. In the case of the new Clinton administration, for example, there were not only difficulties with the appointment of a new attorney general, but the Justice Department was headed for several weeks by a Bush administration holdover. Webb Hubbell, a Clinton confidante and Mrs. Clinton’s former law partner was slated for the number two position at Justice, but even his nomination had not yet been confirmed when the administration took office. According to Webb Hubbell, while “the job was getting done” in those early days, “the administration couldn’t get its program under way because it still had a Republican attorney general. And the media began focusing on what they called a leadership vacuum at Justice.”\textsuperscript{18}

\subsection*{Timing and the Policy Agenda}

The president-elect’s political agenda might also figure in the timing and pace of Cabinet and other appointments. Early action on appointments in areas that are at top of the president’s agenda permits a head start on an appointments process that is proving to be increasingly lengthy. Early action in particular policy areas also may prove of political benefit: signals of presidential commitment and priority. Both in 1980 and in 1992, presidents-elect Reagan and Clinton emphasized their intentions to vigorously pursue new economic policies by making early appointments and by clustering them together to convey the sense of an economic team. Early action in appointing the White House staff is also critical here. As David Demarest, Bush’s communications director, observes: “You need a White House that is driving an agenda.”\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} White House Interview Program, Interview with David Gergen, Martha Joynt Kumar, Arlington, Va., August 26, 1999.
\textsuperscript{19} White House Interview Program, Interview with David Demarest, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, DC, December 7, 1999.
Policy Teams

An effort at continuity might also be of value at other points in the transition. All recent transitions have created policy teams to translate campaign promises into concrete policy proposals. Placing members of the new administration who will have responsibility in those policy areas on those teams will likely facilitate the policy development process in a timely way. In the 1992 transition, Sandy Berger headed up the national security policy group and became deputy national security adviser in the new administration. In domestic policy, Bruce Reed served as deputy director and later became deputy director of the Domestic Policy Council. In economic affairs, Robert Reich headed up the group (he would be tapped as secretary of labor), and within that group were Robert Rubin (who would become head of the new National Economic Council), Laura D’Andrea Tyson (the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers), and Gene Sperling (who would become Rubin’s deputy at the NEC).

Presentation of a budget message to Congress and the State of the Union address, both of which occur soon after inauguration day, especially require timely action. Although some issues may have clearly risen in the campaign, as Andrew Card notes, “You’ve got to start thinking about it anew.” Moreover, effective movement on the policy front is linked to other elements of a successful transition, particularly in having a team in place who are adept at the art of governance rather than just successful campaigning. Again, according to Card:

... Identify your White House staff early and identify a team of people that will start working on your first policy initiatives. Have them work with the people in the campaign but have it be under the government types rather than the politics types.20

Mack McLarty later recalled that in 1992, while getting a government in place was a first priority, “... the second was certainly to get an economic plan developed. The President had been elected, again, in large measure on the economic ideas he had put forth. We needed to get that ready for legislation, get it to Congress and start the debate.” And, like Card, McLarty notes elsewhere the difference in the task before and after election day: “Obviously you weren’t governing in the campaign. You were running in the campaign.”21

Department and Agency Teams

The teams that most transitions have created to focus on particular departments and agencies are also part of this equation. In 1980, Robert Carleson was tapped to head the transition team for the Department of Health and Human Services. Carleson, a welfare reform expert who had been California’s state welfare director and later U.S. commissioner of welfare under Nixon, was then tapped to head the human services component of Reagan’s domestic policy staff. “In effect,” Robert Carleson later recalled, “I received my own report.”22 In early January, even before Reagan was inaugurated, Carleson met with the president-elect, went over a welfare reform proposal that had already been developed, and obtained Reagan’s approval.

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Lessons From Past Presidential Transitions

Others who have participated in transitions have found extensive efforts in this area to be less useful. **Landon Butler** cautions that in the 1976 Carter transition, “there was a lot of wasted effort...of sort of doing a department-by-department study of what the issues were and presenting [Carter] with policy books...that didn’t turn out to be relevant.”**23**

While department-focused teams may be especially necessary when there is a change in party, **friendly takeovers** do provide an opportunity for a leaner effort in this area. In 1988, for example, the Bush transition could rely—and with a degree of confidence—on the work and reports that were produced by the Reagan administration.

Yet attention to what is going on in the agencies and departments is useful no matter the nature of the transition. The candidate’s agenda aside, the transition needs reliable information about budgets, personnel, organization, pending bills, legislation up for renewal, congressional liaison, and other matters that may be specific to only one department.

**Establishing a Cordial Working Relationship With the Out-Going Administration**

Not only are transitions the occasion for the president-elect to meet with the incumbent president for the traditional policy briefing and tour of the White House, they are also times when members of the transition staff must work constructively with their counterparts in the outgoing administration. Both levels are critical. As **Harrison Wellford** observes:

> It’s very important to the success of a transition that the president-elect develop a constructive, cooperative relationship with the outgoing president and that that atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect be communicated to the outgoing transition team and the incoming transition team. If that’s not done well, then you have the potential for really big problems that can screw up the first hundred days of the new administration.

In particular, transition members need to avoid the “tendency right after the election to still want to fight election battles.”**24**

Likewise, the outgoing administration can smooth the way for their successors. As **Landon Butler** observes of the 1976 transition,

> I think, by and large, we learned far more from our predecessors than we did from any written material...They genuinely wanted us to be successful...I think the most important thing would be to try to make sure they talk to their predecessors and to set a tone and establish in writing: don’t make this a bitter transition, don’t walk out the door.”**25**

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Lessons From Past Presidential Transitions

IV. EARLY DECISIONS: NOT JUST PEOPLE BUT ALSO PROCESS

Early decisions are also advantageous in beginning to put together the processes that the president will use in developing policy and making decisions. Part of that effort will be directed at the organization and operations of the White House staff. In 1980, not only was chief of staff-designate Jim Baker able to craft a White House staff, he and Ed Meese also early on settled on the division of labor between their respective responsibilities. In 1992, by contrast, the planned task force on the White House that had been envisioned by the pre-election transition planning effort was eliminated in the post-election effort. White House matters would be handled informally by Clinton and his top advisors in Little Rock. Yet in competition with the daunting task of cabinet appointments, White House planning was delayed.

**HOW THE CABINET FIGURES IN**

How the cabinet will play a role in policy making is also a matter that might be profitably raised during the transition. Cabinet government—at least in the sense of some collective process involving the whole cabinet—is surely elusive. Yet cabinet members either individually or in particular policy areas will need to be involved in the policy making process. Even if policy making is centered in the White House, many policy issues will likely touch on areas of departmental responsibility and many will likely cross departmental boundaries. Even policies that neatly fit within the domain of a particular department may be matters of White House interest, direction, and coordination.

The 1980 transition, for example, was a time for thinking about how cabinet might best be brought to bear as a resource for presidential decision making. Involvement of the cabinet fit Reagan’s pre-presidential predilections as a decision maker, and during the transition a number of models for involving cabinet members in the policy process were explored. By early February of 1981, that work came to fruition and the cabinet council system was announced. By contrast, four years earlier, Jimmy Carter had wanted cabinet government. Yet little was done during the transition to put that into practice, and the role of the cabinet in Carter’s decision making as well as its integration and coordination with White House policy efforts did not match Carter’s initial hopes.

**POLICY COUNCILS**

It is likely that some form of a domestic policy council and the present National Economic Council will continue in the future. They provide a way of eliciting cabinet input without suffering the pitfalls of full cabinet government. At a minimum, the transition serves as a time for deciding how such councils will be organized and coordinated with both the cabinet and the White House-based policy operations.

There is little statutory guidance here, and a new administration has a significant degree of organizational and administrative discretion. How many councils will there be? What cabinet members will serve on them? Will cabinet members serve as their chairs in the president’s absence (the Reagan-Bush

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26. There is more statutory guidance concerning the National Security Council, although there remains considerable discretion on how the role of the NSC adviser is defined and how the NSC staff is organized and utilized.
practice) or will they be lead by White House staff members (Nixon and Clinton)? How will the work of the councils be staffed? Will the White House’s office of cabinet affairs take the lead (the practice in the second Reagan term and under Bush) or will White House domestic and economic policy staff play the major role (Reagan first term and Clinton)?

V. THE ADVANTAGES -- AND DISADVANTAGES-- OF “FRIENDLY TAKEOVERS”

When the presidency passes to a president-elect of the same party, transition planning can occur within especially advantageous circumstances. Since the Coolidge to Hoover transition in 1928, this has only occurred once: the 1988 Reagan to Bush transition.

The Bush transition especially benefited from the experience that some of its participants had acquired from prior White House and other executive branch service. To take just its personnel operation: Chase Untermeyer had been assistant secretary of the navy for manpower and reserve affairs, J. Bonnie Newman who worked with him had been for a time associate director of the Reagan White House personnel office, while Andrew Card, another key participant, had served in the Reagan White House political office and as director of its intergovernmental affairs unit. According to J. Bonnie Newman, this experience was especially useful. It allowed them to get into organizational roles....So many of us had previously worked together and were known to one another that it was easy to have informal discussions....There was a trust level, a level of familiarity that existed among the group that benefited from those kinds of conversations.

Newman also recalls that the incumbent administration especially aided them in dealing with the increasingly complex financial disclosure forms and clearance procedures. The Reagan White House “really provided us with a road map, which streamlined the process. Boyden [Gray] must have worked really closely with them because he had ready to go, hot off the press, a lot of memoranda providing guidance and instructions regarding the various clearance procedures....We had all of the necessary forms ready.”

Ken Duberstein, who as Reagan chief of staff was in charge of the outgoing 1988 transition, more generally observes that “...since we had known each other for so long, through so many circumstances...it was a discussion among friends who understood each other’s sensitivities.”

INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY

A friendly transition can also facilitate the contact between those designated to fill new positions and their opposite numbers in the outgoing administration or with those who held the position earlier in the administration. Institutional memory between one administration and another can be lean in a White House where, quite literally, at noon of January 20, offices are empty and papers have been carted off to await the opening of yet another presidential library.

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Yet people with experience can fill in some of the gaps. In the 1988 Reagan-to-Bush transition, for example, David Bates, who was placed in charge of the White House cabinet affairs office, could turn to Reagan incumbent Nancy Risque (as well as Bush transition co-director Craig Fuller, who had been secretary to the cabinet in Reagan’s first term). Jim Cicconi, the new staff secretary could call on Richard Darman (as well as draw upon his own experience as deputy chief of staff to Jim Baker). J. Bonnie Newman, who was placed in charge of White House administration and management, could turn to Rhett Dawson, whose responsibilities overlapped with hers. Boyden Gray established a close working relationship with Arthur Culvahouse, the head of the Reagan legal counsel office, as did Untermeyer with Robert Tuttle in the personnel area.

The Bush transition also enjoyed good cooperation in assembling other information that would prove useful to it. It was largely able to dispense with the cumbersome teams that both the Carter and Reagan transitions had created that were directed at particular departments and agencies. In their place, incumbent officials were charged by Chief of Staff Duberstein with assembling that information for them. With respect to White House organization and planning, Andrew Card (who was tapped to serve as John Sununu’s deputy chief of staff) would later recall that: “I went and got every flow chart from every previous White House and I had worked in the Reagan White House so I had a sense...So we were ready to staff up on day one.”

Yet friendly takeovers are not without their problems, particularly if officials within the incumbent administration maneuver to remain their positions. On November 10, 1988, President Reagan instructed that all political appointees submit letters of resignation “effective at the pleasure of the president,” an order that had been agreed upon before the election by the Reagan and Bush camps. Yet, as Card would later note, “I think the friendly takeover was more difficult than the hostile because in the friendly takeover there was almost an expectation for the people who were left in the Reagan Administration that they would stay on.”

In David Gergen’s view, “It’s a much cleaner process when you change parties. Everybody knows, if you’re on the old team, you leave and you leave with good grace.”

VI. SOME FINAL POINTS

LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Presidents-elect and their transition advisers need to be attentive to the unintended consequences of what might seem appropriate actions at the time but which may come back to haunt them later. The pledges to cut the White House staff that are often made during the campaign and transition are but one example. Both the Carter and Clinton White Houses, for example, were negatively affected by that pledge. In Carter’s case it led to intramural competition and bickering about which units were to be cut. For Clinton, the permanent White House staff would suffer, the White House correspondence unit most notably.

In Bush’s case, the issue wasn’t size but hierarchy. He wanted fewer staff members with the title of “assistant to the president” [the top White House rank just below the chief of staff]. The thought was that the number of assistants had grown over the Reagan years--“title creep”--and that at the start of the Bush

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presidency there would be twelve assistants rather than twenty or more. More assistants might be added, moreover, at some future point as a reward for good service. But the change had unintended consequences: the units scaled back were the White House political office, public liaison office, and the intergovernmental affairs office--all crucial to market and selling this president's program. Moreover, “title creep” was scaled back within particular units. As a result the White House speechwriters no longer had staff rank that entitled them to presidential commissions, and with that they no longer had White House mess privileges. News stories about the “demotion” of the speechwriters quickly appeared in the press and the inferences were drawn about the communication strategy and skills of this presidency. In addition, the speechwriters themselves were perhaps cut off from a valuable, informal setting for interaction with their counterparts on the policy side of the White House.

**Heeding Warning Signs**

The transition also can be a time when warning signs appear, particularly as campaign promises begin to get translated into policy commitments. In 1992, Judith Feder headed up the health care policy team during the transition. Her message to Clinton, as David Broder and Haynes Johnson have recounted in their book, The System, was that health care reform was going to be more costly and more difficult than anyone had imagined. Clinton reportedly grew angry at Feder, the messenger; yet it was the message that was the problem. It was an early warning sign Clinton then ignored.

**Dealing With an Increasingly Attentive Media**

The media is paying more attention to transitions now than in the past. Not only does this subject the transition to increasing scrutiny that must be dealt with, but both positive and negative coverage can affect the administration once in office: transition successes and failures are often taken as harbingers of managerial and political competence. In 1992, for example, Clinton pledged not just to have the most ethical administration, but he also proposed the most ethical transition. Tighter rules were quickly developed than had prevailed under the Bush transition four years before. Arguably, the effort was well intended, but predictably the media began to raise questions: Would transition chairman Vernon Jordan step down from a number of corporate boards on which he served? What about the corporate clients of transition director Warren Christopher’s law firm. Would Mack McLarty, the CEO of an oil and gas firm, participate in selection of an energy secretary?

As Harrison Wellford notes, right after the election “...it’s honeymoon; everybody thinks the president-elect is wonderful and his team are all geniuses...” But, he cautions, the media have “a kind of calendar in their mind” about what the pace of the transition should be. “But very soon, very soon--surprisingly soon, within two or three weeks,” Wellford continues, “if you start to slip up in your appointment process, in the relationships with Congress, in the relationship with the outgoing president, and the timing for all of this begins to slip, then all of a sudden--in your first challenge as an executive of the administration--you’re beginning to be seen as wanting.”

Drawing from his own experience in running the personnel operation during the Bush transition, Chase Untermeyer explicitly recommends that

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there be one member of the press office assigned to handle personnel issues full time because that is such a key story....I could either recruit the Bush administration or take care of my own personal press but I couldn’t do both.33

Finally, a general point that David Gergen’s makes: “it’s even more important to get the transition right in this atmosphere because the difficulty of governing and taking hold is more difficult than it used to be. You don’t get the deference one could count on from the press.”34

VII. TRANSITIONS ARE ALSO TIMES TO THINK ABOUT THE PRESIDENT

Although transitions largely focus on personnel, policy, and process, they are also linked to a new president, particularly in creating a new environment in which the president must function as a decision maker. As Martin Anderson observes, “you’ve got to set up an internal organization that is able to reflect and is sensitive to the president.”35

What are the president-elect’s capacities as a decision maker, particularly any strengths or weaknesses. How do past experiences relate to the task ahead both in what they have prepared the president for and what they haven’t. How is the West Wing different from Sacramento, Atlanta or Little Rock? How is it different from the governor’s office in Austin or the Vice-President’s office down the hall? The pre-inauguration period is not only a time for a transition to a new administration it is also a time of transition for the person who will occupy that office.

Related to the president-elect’s capacities as a decision maker are the staff who will service at key points in the decision-making process. How does the staff and decision making processes need to be tailored to this particular president? How should the particular roles of key staff members be defined. Both John Sununu and Mack McLarty publicly stated that they wanted to be “honest brokers.” Yet what does that mean in practice? To what extent should a chief of staff or an NSC adviser attempt to compensate for a president’s weaknesses. To what extent should they be policy advocates?

In Mack McLarty’s view, concerns about the president’s requirements as a decision maker, the role of key staff members, and the broader process in which they would interact each to be factored in. As for Clinton, according to McLarty: “he was not against a formal staff system....But he did reject it being a clinical process where he was served up kind of pros, cons, three positions and accept, check or defer.” Clinton’s preferred style: “[he] wanted a large range of opinions, to be coordinated for sure. But he is clearly an engaged person in terms of both his political style, his personality and his policy making style. So that was kind of the framing of it.” At the same time, for the staff: “The feeling was to have the White House and certainly the chief of staff’s office as an honest broker...there was at least a sentiment that you should have an operation that reflected a much better flow of information to the President, a wider flow of information.”36

35. White House Interview Program, Interview with Martin Anderson, Martha Joynt Kumar, Stanford, CA, August 12, 1999.
**VIII. TRANSITIONS SET MANAGEMENT TASKS**

Finally, the transition period begins the process of bring people and organizations together in ways that foster an effective work environment--it is the starting point for those management tasks that will be crucial once the administration is office. It is a time for creating a sense of teamwork. As Harrison Wellford explains:

... people begin to jockey for their positions in the key jobs. A lot of camaraderie and teamwork and good feeling that you ended the election night celebration with comes to a crashing climax.\(^{37}\)

Moreover, Wellford continues, success on this front is related to organizational effectiveness of the transition: “I think the more poorly organized you are, the worse that it is.”

Transitions thus present an opportunity for sending strong signals about expectations regarding behavior and commitment. In David Gergen’s view, this recognition helped Reagan in 1981:

Everybody who came in knew where he stood. There were no struggles over the soul of the administration, over the overall direction. You knew what the philosophy was; then you knew what the policy prescription was going to be at least in the domestic area.\(^{38}\)

More broadly, as Clinton’s second chief of staff, Leon Panetta, recently remarked in a panel discussion on transitions sponsored by the Heritage Foundation: “The reality is that you need to have a sense of mission, of duty, of discipline.”\(^{39}\) I would suggest that task is also one that must begin during the transition.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Professor John Burke teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University of Vermont. He is the author of the recently published book Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice. His previous books include The Institutional Presidency: Organizing and Managing the White House From FCR to Clinton and How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965, the winner of the Richard E. Neustadt Prize for the best book on the presidency published in 1990.

Contact Information

by email:  jpburke@zoo.uvm.edu
phone  802/ 656.0865
ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT

http://whitehouse2001.org

Presidency scholars lead a two-part project designed to provide incoming White House staff members with information on operating key White House offices and to help presidential nominees fill out the tidal wave of forms they face in the appointments process. Funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts, a foundation known for the stature of its programs and the nonpartisan nature of its organization, the White House 2001 Project works with two broad, Pew initiatives: The Transition to Governing Project of the American Enterprise Institute and the Presidential Appointee Initiative of the Brookings Institution. White House 2001 was designed and developed by the board and members of the Presidency Research Group, the worldwide professional organization of scholars focused on the American presidency and a section of the American Political Science Association.

THE WHITE HOUSE INTERVIEW PROGRAM

Unlike corporations both large and small, a White House begins without a record compiled by its previous occupants. The goal of the White House Interview Program is to smooth the path to power by furnishing incoming staff with substantive information about the operation of seven White House offices critical to an effective beginning: Chief of Staff, Staff Secretary, Press Office, Office of Communications, Office of the Counsel to the President, Office of Management and Administration, and the Office of Presidential Personnel. Through interviews with current and former White House staff members from the last six administrations, the White House Interview Program provides new staff with detailed information about how their White House offices function, the organization of their units, and the roles played by the heads of each office.

In addition to this institutional memory, the White House Interview Program provides a support package of important tools previous staff have identified as invaluable. These tools include a “rolodex” of contact information about the people who previously served in their posts with current addresses and phone numbers. The White House Interview Program also provides the first ever detailed organization charts of White House offices approximately every six months through the Carter administration. The scholars associated with the project, researching and writing about the White House staff, are nationally recognized for their work on the presidency. They are: Professors Peri Arnold, MaryAnne Borrelli, John Burke, George Edwards, Karen Hult, Nancy Kassop, John Kessel, Martha Joynt Kumar, Bradley Patterson, James Pfiffner, Terry Sullivan, Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Charles Walcott, Shirley Anne Warshaw, and Stephen Wayne.

NOMINATION FORMS ONLINE

In order to address the volume of information required from appointees and the problem of the plethora of forms to be filled out by nominees, the Nomination Forms Online program provides a software package that nominees can use to complete the myriad of forms required by the White House, the FBI, the US Office of Government Ethics, and, where appropriate, the Senate committee of jurisdiction. The software uses innovative programming techniques so that the software distributes repetitive information across the several forms nominees must complete. The software allows the nominee to store information for future use in completing annual reports. It also makes available a portable file of data in standard formats so the nominee can share information, at his or her discretion, with the White House Office of Presidential Personnel and other agencies. Nomination Forms Online is freeware.
THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT
REPORT SERIES

available in PDF format (as noted) from: http://whitehouse2001.org

GENERAL SERIES

This collection of reports from the White House 2001 Project describe topics of general concern to White House operations. Those in the general series marked with an asterisk (*) are currently only available to the Presidential Transition Team.

1. Opportunities and Hazards – The White House Interview Program
2. Meeting the Freight Train Head On – Planning for the Presidential Transition
3. Lessons from Past Transitions
5. The Presidency and the Political Environment*
6. The White House World – Start Up, Organization, and the Pressures of Work Life*
7. A Guide to Inquiry*
8. Analyzing Questionnaires – Executive Forms for Nominees*

WHITE HOUSE STAFF SERIES

This collection of reports from the White House 2001 Project create an “institutional memory” for the White House Staff. Currently, these reports are available only to the Presidential Transition Team. Look for a release of these reports in the Spring of 2001.

21. Office of the Chief of Staff
22. Organization Charts for the Office of Chief of Staff
23. Office of the Staff Secretary
24. Organization Charts for the Office of the Staff Secretary
25. Office of Management and Administration
26. Organization Charts for the Office of Management and Administration
27. Office of Presidential Personnel
28. Organization Charts for the Office of Presidential Personnel
29. Office of Counsel to the President
30. Organization Charts for the Office of Counsel to the President
31. Press Office
32. Organization Charts for the Press Office
33. Office of Communications
34. Organization Charts for the Office of Communications