

THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT
THE WHITE HOUSE INTERVIEW PROGRAM
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THE PRESIDENCY
& THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT

THE WHITE HOUSE INTERVIEW PROGRAM

THE PRESIDENCY & THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

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An effective White House staff, Howard Baker tells us, is an extension of the President's. Drawing on their own experience, other White House veterans explain why. Richard Cheney sees a good White House staff as absolutely essential to a President's success. "A President can do a lot based on his own personal skills, but there's a limit. His reach, his ability to guide and direct the government, to interact with the cabinet, to deal effectively with the Congress, to manage his relationship with the press... are all key ingredients to his success," and the presidential staff gives him these capacities.¹ David Gergen (who served in communication posts in four administrations) points out that the presidential staff has become "his intelligence-gathering operation, it's his media management team, it's his congressional team, it's his formulation of his policy."² Because of these staff contributions, W. Bowman (Bowman) Cutter (who held economic positions in the Carter and Clinton White Houses) adds, the staff maximizes the most valuable commodity in government, the President's time.

Who are the critical players in carrying out these responsibilities? Interestingly, there is a bipartisan consensus on this point. With small variations, Democrats Leon Panetta and Harrison Wellford (who worked on reorganization and administration in the Carter OMB), and Republicans Roger Porter (who held economic/domestic posts in three administrations) and Jerry Jones (staff secretary in the Nixon and Ford White Houses) list the same positions: Chief of Staff, congressional relations chief, Press Secretary, national security assistant, economic advisor (usually including the OMB director and sometimes another source of economic guidance), chief domestic aide, and counsel. These persons give vital advice to the President, and direct important staffs of their own. Whether the President is a Democrat or a Republican, he needs skilled professionals in these positions.

Returning to Howard Baker's fundamental point, how does the White House staff allow the President to extend his own governance throughout a complex political environment? Since the staff serves as intermediary between the President and all the other institutions that make up the political environment, it must be anchored at both ends. That is, presidential aides must adapt to the President's way of doing business, and also must adapt to the work styles of legislators, journalists, diplomats, economists, and the rest who inhabit the political jungle surrounding the White House. Only when the staff is secure in their relations

¹ Almost all of the quotations in this essay, including this quotation from Richard Cheney, are from interviews conducted by Martha Joynt Kumar for the White House Interview Program. A few quotations are from interviews I have conducted in the past. White House Interview Program, Interview with Richard Cheney, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., July 27, 1999.

² White House Interview Program, Interview with David Gergen, Martha Joynt Kumar, Shirlington, Va., August 26, 1999.

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with the President *t and* all the presidential clienteles can they bring essential stability to the President's relations with his political environment.

THE NEED TO ADAPT TO PRESIDENTS

Presidents, of course, differ from one another. Clinton was different from Bush who was different from Reagan who was different from Carter and so on all the way back to Washington himself. Yet Roger Porter calls our attention to an important characteristic they have in common. Presidents come to office as mature individuals. "They're not in the formative stage of their life; they're not figuring out how they're going to do things.... Given [that and] all of the pressures that are attendant with that job, the notion that they are going to adapt is rarely the case."³ The result, in the words of James Cicconi (a deputy of the Chief of Staff in the Reagan and Bush administrations), is that you usually "have to adapt the system in the White House to the President's work style rather than expect [presidents] to adapt their work style to the system."⁴ Hence White House staffers must discover how each President *t* likes to work, how he likes to make decisions, the degree of detail with which he is comfortable, what types of things he wants to see himself and what types of things he is willing to let others handle for him.

There are other constants in adapting to presidents. One is the importance of trust. Trust is essential to full and frank exchanges, and to the President's willingness to let key aides act in his name. When Leon Panetta was asked to take over as Chief of Staff, he went to President Clinton and said, "I have to have your full support because there are some decisions that have to be made and I need to make sure that I have your full support and trust in that process."⁵ He said the same thing to the First Lady, and in fact set up regular meetings to report to her. These lasted for about six months, by which time bonds of trust had been solidified with both President and Mrs. Clinton.

Still another constant is that some staff members must be able to take bad news to the President *t*, or insist that he attend to some task he would rather avoid. Consequently, there are times when aides must be firm with their President *t*. Michael Deaver, a deputy Chief of Staff who had known Ronald Reagan for twenty years, could say to him, "Wait a minute....this is Michael and it is important that you don't dismiss what I am saying here...It's important that you listen carefully to what I'm saying."⁶ He said: "Sometimes you have to hit the President in the head with the proverbial 'two-by-four' to get his attention." Few people, Deaver explained, could have that kind of conversation because few were confident enough of their relationship with the President *t* to use such blunt language. Still, Deaver continued, it was vital to have staff members who could go into the Oval Office and say, "I hate to tell you this, but this is what [other] people won't tell you."⁷ Speechwriter David Demarest, who had not known George Bush nearly as long as Deaver had known Reagan, spoke about the effort needed to get President Bush to consider something he'd rather dismiss. "You'd really have to get in there and say, 'Mr. President, I know you may not agree with me but I'd appreciate it if you would just hear me out.' You could see there's a little impatience there, but you've just got to do it."⁸ Roy Neel, who served as deputy Chief of Staff in the first year of the Clinton administration, spoke of the need to tell the President *t* that sometimes a faithful campaign aide wasn't the best person to

³ White House Interview Program, Interview with Roger Porter, Martha Joynt Kumar, Cambridge, MA., October 22, 1999.

⁴ White House Interview Program, Interview with James Cicconi, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., November 29, 1999.

⁵ White House Interview Program, Interview with Leon Panetta, Martha Joynt Kumar, Monterey Bay, CA., May 4, 2000.

⁶ White House Interview Program, Interview with Michael Deaver, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1999.

⁷ White House Interview Program, Interview with David Demarest, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., December 7, 1999.

⁸ Michael Deaver interview.

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appoint to the White House staff. “It’s very tough and it takes a senior staff and a Chief of Staff that’s willing to stand up to the President t... and say, ‘No. There’s a better person who is better suited to serve you in this role.’”⁹

Even at this early point, we can see two requisites of a White House staff. First, if a staff is to carry out its crucial responsibilities, those in the key positions must have a high degree of competence. Second, if a staff is to have an effective relationship with their President t, there must be persons who either out of long acquaintance or from personal capacities can win the trust of the President t and be willing to speak with complete candor. Ideally, staff members ought to have both capacities, but practically some bring a high order of professional skill and others close personal ties. It is clear, though, that both abilities must be present for a staff to be effective.

ADAPTATION TO INDIVIDUAL PRESIDENTS

Richard Nixon. All presidents differ from one another, and just as their behavior patterns vary, so do the adaptations employed by their staffs to work with them. Richard Nixon was a very intelligent man, but also a solitary man who wanted to spend time alone. Chief of staff H.R. Haldeman reported in his diary that Nixon assigned him to handle contacts with the four most senior cabinet members, assigned chief domestic aide John Ehrlichman to handle the rest, and gave OMB director George Shultz and John Ehrlichman authority to make all budget decisions. Personnel head Fred Malek tells us that while Nixon was interested in loyalty, he was not interested in running the White House and left that to Haldeman as well. Nixon further distanced himself from other persons by using formal memos to communicate his instructions. Decision memos one or two inches thick would be returned to staff members with inked notations (“I agree.” “Don’t do this.”) in the margin. Nixon also began an overnight news summary, which he would annotate and circulate to senior staff members for the same purpose.

Nixon’s staff generally followed the Eisenhower pattern of a hierarchical structure. The major addition was the Domestic Council. According to Jerry Jones, the staff featured a strong chief, a strong staff secretary (Jones himself who monitored all of the paperwork going in and out of the Oval Office), and strong people heading the policy staffs. Jones’ mandate from Nixon was to ensure excellence in the skill jobs. Nixon also gave instructions to write decision memos that presented options for his own choice, giving the advantages and disadvantages in as neutral language as possible. This staff system worked well with foreign policy and domestic policy. Political decisions, however, did not go through this staff system, and Nixon’s judgment in filling the political slots, Jones thought, was quite poor. The combination of “tough” political aides and Nixon’s own belief that enemies surrounded him laid the foundation for Watergate.

Gerald Ford. A “spokes of the wheel” model seemed a natural for a Ford staff. They wanted to avoid anything linked to Watergate, and were therefore averse to the hierarchical staff system they mistakenly associated with it. Moreover, being in the center of a communication network is the way a congressional party leader functions. But Donald Rumsfeld, his new Chief of Staff, said he would not be a party to spokes of the wheel in the White House. Ford told Rumsfeld he agreed. “Look, I’ve announced it [but]... let a little time walk over it, and we’ll never operate that way.”¹⁰

⁹ White House Interview Program, Interview with Roy Neel, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., June 15, 1999.

¹⁰ White House Interview Program, Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, Martha Joynt Kumar, Chicago, IL, April 25, 2000..

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Ford faced real organizational problems. His staff was a mix of Nixon holdovers, Ford's own vice presidential staff, and new staff members recruited after Ford became President. Further, he had no prior executive experience. Ford coped with the staff problem by relying on a subset of the full staff while leaving the others in place. Even more important, Ford's personal strengths, specifically his self-confidence and willingness to trust others, allowed Ford to be one of the rare cases who could adapt to unfamiliar executive routines rather than insisting that the staff adapt to his work style. In Jerry Jones' view Ford used the staff system better than Nixon. "The staff system," Jones explained, lobs a memo into the President that has four options.... Half the time [Ford would] say, 'I don't like any of these options. I want a meeting.... So the next morning there would be a meeting of five people and they would come up with a better option than any of the ones in the memo.... Ford really made the system work for him."¹¹ Gerald Ford could never overcome the political weakness resulting from Watergate, but he learned how to work with a White House staff more swiftly than any other contemporary President.

Jimmy Carter. President Carter brought a fixed style of executive leadership developed as governor of Georgia. Political scientists Charles O. Jones and Erwin Hargrove have pointed out that Carter saw himself as speaking for Everyman, and therefore expected others to accept whatever recommendations he made. He developed policies based on expertise, quite a different style than a politics of bargaining. Carter's major staff members remained with him, and he always looked to the person responsible for an area for advice on that topic. And President Carter dealt with others largely on paper. Memos flowed into the Oval Office, and flowed back out with Carter's green-ink instructions.

Jimmy Carter had a phenomenal capacity to absorb facts. Ray Jenkins (a special assistant to Carter who worked with the press) estimated that Carter read 350 pages of official documents each day. Bowman Cutter saw a man "who was quite good at time management and had an absolute iron discipline. [He had an] ability to focus on things for a very long time when he needed to."¹² Cutter also believed that in adapting to this President, the job chief domestic aide Stuart Eizenstat did was "absolutely priceless. He was a very orderly person. He could present [a range of ideas] to the President with total honesty and without biasing the presentation in one direction or the other."¹³ However, President Carter's cognitive style was to focus on one question at a time, to decide that in a particular case the administration would do *x* or *y*, rather than setting the information in some larger context that would give meaning and direction to his administration.

Ronald Reagan. According to Howard Baker, Reagan "was a wonderful delegator and he would let people have wide latitude about how they carried out his policy."¹⁴ But Reagan also dealt with his staff through a small number of senior aides. Consequently, it made a great deal of difference who he selected as Chief of Staff. There is broad consensus that James Baker and Howard Baker were excellent chiefs of staff, and Kenneth Duberstein belongs in the same category. But Chief of Staff Donald Regan, Michael Deaver reports, "certainly didn't know how to deal with Ronald Reagan," and the Regan staff was less well adapted to Reagan.¹⁵

Reagan did not rely on paper as Nixon and Carter did. He read whatever was sent to him, but he understood people better than abstract concepts. Consequently, he got more out of having an issue argued out in front of him. During his first administration, James Baker, Ed Meese (a counselor who dealt with

¹¹ White House Interview Program, Interview with Jerry Jones, Martha Joynt Kumar, Rosslyn, VA., April 11, 2000.

¹² White House Interview Program, Interview with Bowman Cutter, Martha Joynt Kumar, New York, N.Y., November 8, 1999.

¹³ Bowman Cutter interview.

¹⁴ White House Interview Program, Interview with Howard Baker, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., November 12, 1999.

¹⁵ Michael Deaver interview .

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policy), and Michael Deaver would meet with him every morning. Reagan and all three aides would have their lists and they would work their way through them. Afterward James Cicconi recalls, “Baker would come back... with stacks of clips and stuff [President Reagan had] ripped out of the news summary... or the newspapers” together with questions the staff would have to answer for Reagan.¹⁶

Ronald Reagan was also an instinctive strategist. Ed Meese says that Reagan didn’t have to be told there was a middle ground between carrying one’s own coat and being an imperial President. Kenneth Duberstein points out that that social conservatives wanted him to support their issues. But “Reagan knew that the votes weren’t there in Congress, so... he was going to spend his chips on things they could get done” such as tax cuts.¹⁷ Reagan was interested in accomplishment, not suicide missions.

George Bush. George Bush was not a particularly curious or reflective man, but he was protective of the White House decision process. The best view of Bush’s work style comes from James Cicconi who described his role as being Bush’s in box and out box. It was his responsibility to make sure that the options among which Mr. Bush had to decide were clear, and that presidential decisions were implemented once made. Cicconi discovered that if he had an involved memo for President Bush, it was best to send it to him at Camp David. Bush would get up at six or seven in the morning to read through his paper, and if he read material when he was not interrupted, Bush’s response was likely to be more thoughtful. Further, if someone else gave Bush a memo in a private meeting, he would give it to Cicconi to be staffed out. “President Bush understood that the system was there to protect him against ill-informed decisions, to make sure that he had full information.”¹⁸

George Bush listened carefully, and understood everyone’s position. But he was a conciliator, not a visionary, so whom he was listening to made a lot of difference. Generally he fared better in foreign policy, both because he expert in this area himself and because he had a stronger group of advisors. Bush was less certain of himself in domestic policy, and some of his domestic advisors were unsuited to their positions. Chief of staff John Sununu, for example, was combative, and the ill will he generated caused difficulties in policies and relationships.

Bill Clinton. President Clinton, Leon Panetta said, loves to have a lot of people around, and to discuss decisions endlessly. Unfortunately, that also creates organizational chaos. The same word occurred to Bowman Cutter. “I think Clinton kind of enjoys the chaos and is uncomfortable without it. . . and would be the last person to recognize that the [White House] wasn’t working.”¹⁹ Perhaps, but seventeen months into his administration, Clinton asked Panetta, a self-described control freak, to take over as Chief of Staff. Panetta thereupon began deciding “who would go into the Oval Office for... a briefing so there would not be a hundred people in the room. [Panetta] would say, if it were an education issue, we want the secretary of education, we want the key [White House] staff person dealing with educational issues. You want to have myself and perhaps somebody looking at the PR [and budget or spending] aspects of it.”²⁰ Further, Panetta would meet with the participants beforehand to make sure that the arguments were sharpened and the points for decision were clear.

¹⁶ White House Interview Program, Interview with James Cicconi, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., November 29, 1999.

¹⁷ White House Interview Program, Interview with Kenneth Duberstein, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., August 12, 1999.

¹⁸ James Cicconi interview.

¹⁹ Bowman Cutter interview.

²⁰ Leon Panetta interview.

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Bill Clinton was deeply interested in both policy and politics, and was marvelously well informed about both. Since the White House stands at the intersection of substantive policy and partisan politics, these were formidable skills. What Clinton needed to get the most from these talents was a staff that would compensate for his lack of self-discipline. Panetta and his successors as Chief of Staff brought enough organization to get decisions made and implemented. Bill Clinton did not have this organizational advantage at the same time he had a Democratic Congress, but with it he was able to gain reelection and remain popular throughout his second term.

Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton were very different men. Yet in each case, successful adaptation meant adjusting procedures in order to maximize their strengths and compensate for their weaknesses.

ADAPTATION TO POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Each unit of the presidential staff works in a different segment of the political environment, and hence must adapt in a somewhat different way. Further, sometimes the persons with whom they interact are intermediaries to those ultimately affected, as when a domestic staff member has direct contact with the Labor Department and union officials in order to gauge the reaction of blue collar workers. And in some cases, knowledge of the environment may come from literature. This happens if the counsel's office looks up decisions in a law library or the council of economic advisers analyzes recent statistics. Whatever the means of contact, though, the staff must have positive knowledge of the reaction of clientele groups in order to assure stable relations.

We cannot, of course, recount all White House contact with external actors. Therefore we will focus on the environments in which six vital units are active: Congress, the media, foreign policy, economics, domestic policy, and the legal environment.

CONGRESS

The need for cordial relationships with Capitol Hill is illustrated by a story told by Pendleton James, Reagan's initial personnel chief. Bryce Harlow (who handled congressional relations for both Eisenhower and Nixon) had counseled him never to appoint a congressional staffer to a regulatory job because the staffer would always be beholden to the congressional sponsor. Then Senator Packwood asked for three jobs, and James asked James Baker what he wanted to do. "James looked at me like I'd just fallen off the turnip truck. He said, 'Give them to him.'... James was thinking politically. He knew he was going to need Packwood's vote on issues."²¹

Kenneth Duberstein (who was Reagan's head congressional liaison before he became Chief of Staff) spoke about vetting potential nominees before personnel decisions are made.

You consult with the chairman and ranking member, with the Senate leader and minority leader, saying, 'Here are the people we are thinking about. Do you have any sense of any of them? This is not a final decision that's going to the President t... Here is the short list.' The reactions vary: So and so

²¹ White House Interview Program, Interview with E. Pendleton James, Martha Joynt Kumar, New York, N.Y., November 8, 1999.

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is wonderful. I've never heard of this guy. She is very close to a Senator from another state. And so on.

What the legislative liaison staff wants to do, Duberstein explained, is to identify political pitfalls. "You're saving the President t problems because if in fact he goes forward with an intent to nominate and then it blows up, you are spending chips that you're going to need elsewhere."²²

Leon Panetta recounted the decisions on priorities that are made after the major outlines are set in the budget and State of the Union Message. He used reauthorization of the elementary and secondary education act as an example. "Do you want to try to get it done before the budget process or... during the appropriations stuff or do you want to save it for negotiations at the end if you have gridlock on the budget and try to negotiate in to a final packet with the Congress? There are all kinds of tactical decisions that you have to make. If you're smart you try to say we want to get the budget, we obviously want to get our appropriations and priorities. On top of that we want to get elementary and secondary education done."²³

These decisions need to be made with accurate information in hand. Howard Baker underscored the efficacy of conversations with former Senate colleagues, saying that he got better understanding from them than in any other way. "When [Dan] Inouye and Warren Rudman came down, for instance ... and sat down with me in the office, we knew each other, we didn't have to have any preliminaries and I got the straight scoop from them about what was possible and what was not possible. And they got the straight scoop from me on how the President t would react. It didn't take fifteen minutes."²⁴

Kenneth Duberstein also stressed the importance of free and open exchange of information with legislators. "You have to share information. There aren't any secrets in this town. The walls talk. Gotcha or surprises don't work when you're legislating."²⁵ It is essential, Duberstein emphasized, to realize many Hill veterans possess as much or more expertise than do White House staffers. Therefore one should work with them even though it often takes a long time. New administrations, he said, often come in with an almost religious fervor. "It doesn't work in this town. You have to make friendships; you have to make accommodations with the other side."²⁶

Finally, when working on the Hill, it needs to be understood that there will be times when a representative or a senator cannot vote with the administration. Donald Rumsfeld made it quite clear he was not looking for one hundred percent support. "I want someone in Congressional Relations who can get Joe two times out of [three], get Michael three times out of ten, and can get Jane four times out of ten. And we'll have floating coalitions. Now that's a way of dealing with the Congress. You don't dead-end it and say, 'By gosh, if you vote against me, you're the enemy, and I'm not going to talk to you, I'm not going to deal with you.'"²⁷

²² White House Interview Program, Interview with Kenneth Duberstein, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., August 12, 1999.

²³ Leon Panetta interview.

²⁴ Howard Baker interview.

²⁵ Kenneth Duberstein interview.

²⁶ Kenneth Duberstein interview.

²⁷ Donald Rumsfeld interview.

THE MEDIA

The reporters who are the core of the press office's constituency are those accredited to the White House, especially those on the White House beat who show up every day and spend most of their time in the Executive Mansion. Pete Roussel (a long time Bush aide who worked in the press office in both the Ford and Reagan administrations) speaks for all White House spokesmen when he says, "you're in the middle of a giant taffy pull."²⁸ On the one hand, there's a voracious press corps saying tell us everything; on the other, the White House is saying tell them just this. He is reminded of both masters by his continual contact with White House colleagues, and the stack of pink slips alerting him to return reporters' phone calls.

When Gerald Warren, who had been city editor of the *San Diego Union*, was joining the Nixon White House press staff, the tenor of Nixon and Haldeman's comments was "you're working for us and not for the press." Warren said he told them he knew that, but while he recognized "you won't fill [all the press's desires] because you're working for a President t, but [a press spokesman must] know their needs and know how [journalism] works."²⁹ Press secretary Michael McCurry came to the Clinton White House after serving as the State Department spokesman. He thought the White House journalists' needs had been neglected. McCurry told Clinton, Mrs. Clinton, and Panetta, "You've got to have some flexibility in [the Press Secretary's] job to be able to wrestle with the press every day and see what they're interested in, make sure they're taken care of in addition to taking care of our agenda.....I'm going to have to bend over backwards," McCurry continued, "to help these people out, and you're going to have to understand that."³⁰ Two presidents, who were as defiant of the press as any, were both told that their spokespersons could be effective only if they were cognizant of reporters' requirements and worked with them.

"My constituency," Ray Jenkins explained, "was the American Society of Newspaper Editors."³¹ Prior to joining the Carter press office, Jenkins had been editor of the *Montgomery Advertiser-Journal*, and he was to serve as liaison between the White House and editors across the country. Working through the network of contacts he had built up through the years, he would place calls saying, for example, "Look. We've got a policy initiative that we're going to announce tomorrow and, if you're going to editorialize on this, I'll be happy to set up an interview with the secretary of the treasury, or [perhaps] a conference call with him so your editorial board can discuss it."³² He would not make such arrangements for, say, *New York Times* reporters who were quite capable of getting their own interviews, but on a slightly less august level, he would arrange interviews with ranking administration officials. His external journalistic contacts combined with his internal press office access often enabled many newspapers to write better-informed stories.

Reporters were often successful in obtaining administration action. The Reagan White House was reluctant to have presidential press conferences because the preparation required that the President's schedule be cleared for two preceding afternoons. Finally, Michael Deaver tells us, Press Secretary Larry Speakes would come in and say, "I can't take it any more. You've got to do a press conference."³³ Deaver said it always bugged him that they would be forced to respond, but they adapted to the reporters' needs.

²⁸ White House Interview Program, Interview with Peter Roussel, Martha Joynt Kumar and Terry Sullivan, Houston, TX., November 3, 1999.

²⁹ White House Interview Program, Interview with Gerald Warren, Martha Joynt Kumar, Middleberg, VA, October 18, 1999.

³⁰ White House Interview Program, Interview with Michael McCurry, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., March 27, 2000.

³¹ White House Interview Program, Interview with Ray Jenkins, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., September 8, 1999.

³² Ray Jenkins interview.

³³ Michael Deaver interview.

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Marlin Fitzwater (Press Secretary for both Reagan and Bush) found ways to use his press constituency to help him inside the White House. He asked President Bush if he would like to hear his briefings. Bush said, "Yes. I heard LBJ used to listen to briefings."³⁴ So Fitzwater had a speaker placed on the President's desk, and on those of key staff members as well. In that way, they could all hear the questions reporters were asking, and judge how well he was defending the administration. Fitzwater also used his constituency's need for information to find out things. "I could go to OMB and say I really need to know this. They would say why; why do you need to know that? Everybody wants to protect their information. I said, 'Hey, look. I've got fifty reporters down there that are demanding to know this.'"³⁵

FOREIGN POLICY

Members of the National Security Council staff are recruited largely from the State Department, Defense Department, and academic specialists in foreign policy. Since the NSC constituency consists principally of foreign political, diplomatic, and military leaders, and the American agencies that deal with them, the backgrounds of the NSC staff members are congruent with those of their clientele groups.

The type of contact each person has depends on their rank and responsibilities. The assistant to the President for national security affairs has become one of the most important jobs in government. This is true whether the national security assistant is as much a magnet for publicity as Nixon's Henry Kissinger or is as unassuming as Brent Scowcroft, who served both Ford and Bush. Sandy Berger, President Clinton's national security assistant, is constantly in touch with heads of government and his own counterparts in international affairs. He was the first American sent to China after the Taiwanese elections in March 2000, at the President's side during the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in July, and left with him to travel to the G-8 economic summit in Okinawa.

It is less widely realized that other staff members are involved in similar activities. Take David Aaron, President Carter's deputy national security assistant. He sat in for his boss Zbigniew Brzezinski at a lot of meetings and ran meetings himself at the subcabinet level. Because of his rank, Aaron was more adaptable. "I have a little more flexibility in some respects because I don't have any problem talking with a [State Department] desk officer or talking with a cabinet officer. I can do both. The protocol is a little more awkward for Zbig. He really can't do that."³⁶

Aaron was also centrally involved in discussions in the late seventies about whether the US should station medium-range missiles in Western Europe. In late 1977, German Chancellor Schmidt had suggested installing such missiles to counter Soviet missiles. A discussion within the US government concluded that the missiles should be installed, but it should first be ascertained if European governments were willing to provide adequate support. Aaron was chosen to conduct these negotiations because he represented the President (rather than a single governmental agency), and sounded out heads of government about this during 1978 and 1979. Similarly, in 1989 when a post-Cold War vision of NATO was being previewed, and again in 1990 when a negotiating position on Conventional Forces in Europe was being developed, Robert Gates, President Bush's deputy national security assistant, and Lawrence Eagleburger, the deputy secretary of state, were dispatched for talks with Prime Minister Thatcher and other European leaders.

³⁴ White House Interview Program, Interview with Marlin Fitzwater, Martha Joynt Kumar, Deale, MD., October 21, 1999.

³⁵ Marlin Fitzwater interview.

³⁶ Personal interview with John Kessel.

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James Thomson, a physicist detailed from the Defense Department in the late 1970s, served as a member of the Carter national security staff. His responsibilities dealt with defense and arms control related to Europe, and his activities are typical of a rank-and-file NSC staffer. When in Washington, he spent most of his time coordinating policies with colleagues on the NSC staff, the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Arms Control Agency. "I'm a twenty to thirty phone call a day guy,"³⁷ he said. Thomson also made a number of trips to European countries and to NATO headquarters. He made an interesting point about how foreign travel facilitated working with others in the domestic political environment. "We travel together a lot, and there's nothing like that to make personal friends. You go out and you go drinking a lot. Really, it helps business. [Back in Washington] you can call up and say, 'This is just bullshit.' Or 'Can't you get your guys to fix things?' Really, it makes things much easier."³⁸

James Fetig's responsibilities were still different. A career army officer in the Clinton national security council press office, he quickly found that while certain topics – Israel, China/Taiwan -- were very sensitive, every policy had a history that went with it, words that had been said and not said, as well as other words that had unanticipated connotations. In gathering guidance, the NSC press office "would start with the NSC policy directorates. Their job was to go to agencies... and get input for the day... and then distill those into succinct talking points that could be used by anybody that required them. They were the ones who made sure that the language, the nuances, were exactly right."³⁹ Working in a sensitive environment, the NSC press office wanted to convey accurate information, but even more they were anxious to avoid unintentional misunderstanding.

ECONOMICS

Many federal agencies have some impact on the American economy, but the most important entities through which the President works are the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers. Each of these has contact with flesh-and-blood humans and abstract economic data, and each deals with different aspects of the economy.

Secretaries of the Treasury tend to come from corporate or financial backgrounds. The treasury needs to be in touch with the financial markets to carry out its responsibilities, so it requires leaders who have many contacts in this community. Clinton's Robert Rubin, co-chairman of Goldman, Sachs, was typical in this respect. "What I think [Clinton] thought he was getting [by appointing Rubin] was kind of an instant stamp of adulthood from the financial community," said Bowman Cutter. As it happened, he got much more. Rubin had "an absolutely unique capacity to deal with people and get things done.... [He really had] a focus on knitting a lot of things together, international economics, what you say about the private sector, what you say about markets; [and] a knowledge from the beginning that it was important to have a good relationship with [Alan] Greenspan."⁴⁰

For decades, OMB has been collecting budget requests from agencies throughout Washington, and compiling them into the budget the President submits to Congress. Every fall experienced budget examiners go over each request with the agencies, and if they approve add it to the budget. By the time the budget reaches the director and the President, almost all the decisions have been made although controversial calls

³⁷ Personal interview with John Kessel.

³⁸ Personal interview with John Kessel.

³⁹ White House Interview Program, Interview with, Martha Joynt Kumar, Rockville, MD., February 5, 1999.

⁴⁰ Bowman Cutter interview.

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are still open to appeal. The civil servants in OMB are less oriented to politics than to efficiency in the allocation of resources. “The whole matters,” Bowman Cutter explained. “If we do this.... how does [it] affect the rest of the programs? How does this affect what else is going to happen with the budget? [Since they often oppose particular programs because of the impact elsewhere in the budget] they are always regarded by [politically oriented members of] the White House staff as the people who for some unknown reason won’t let them do what they want to do.”⁴¹ The involved process of compiling the budget means that someone who understands the myriad decisions that went into it should defend it. While Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta spent a lot of time negotiating on the Hill because he was familiar with the budget issues. “I would suspect,” he said, “as OMB director with McLarty [as Chief of Staff], McLarty basically let me do the negotiations on it because he wasn’t that familiar with the issues. I think that even now, I think [Chief of Staff] John Podesta probably lets [OMB director] Jack Lew do a lot of that.”⁴²

The Council of Economic Advisers represents the views of professional economists. Over the years they have been very influential or almost totally neglected depending on the esteem in which the President holds them. The Council consists of only three economists, but the staff includes several more. Usually the economists come from universities, and sometimes are quite distinguished. The Kennedy CEA, for instance, included one member, James Tobin, and two staff members, Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow, who were future Nobel Prize winners. Their activities doing economic analyses, helping members of the White House staff understand economic data, and writing a turn-of-the-year *Economic Report*. The completion of the *Economic Report*, along with the State of the Union Message and Budget, is an action-forcing deadline that compels each administration to set its policy direction for the coming year.

Given the separate constituencies to which these agencies are adapted, and the different aspects of the economy they address, there is an obvious need for coordination. There are two formal mechanisms through which this is accomplished. Each administration creates a coordinating body. The oldest is the *troika*, made up of the treasury secretary, OMB director, and chair of the CEA. The troika can be as simple in operation as these three persons meeting for lunch. Then other officials can be added to create troika plus groups. Finally, there are elaborate councils such as Ford’s Economic Policy Board and Clinton’s National Economic Council.

The second mechanism is the troika’s annual forecasting exercise, begun by President Kennedy. Over time, three organizational levels have been recognized as T1, T2, and T3. T1 consists of the three principals; T2 is at the deputy level, the assistant of the treasury for tax policy, an assistant director of OMB, and a member of CEA; T3 is composed of staff members from the three agencies. T1 begins by stipulating the economic assumptions. T3 then gathers data and shapes a forecast within the parameters they have been given. When they are satisfied, the forecast goes upward to T2, and when T2 is satisfied, it is passed along to T1. Ultimately it is presented to the President as a recommended forecast.

The economic activities of any administration are determined by challenges presented by the economic environment. Although Democrats have a greater tendency to rely on governmental mechanisms and Republicans lean toward private enterprise, economist Samuel Morley and political scientist Erwin Hargrove, after interviewing ten CEA chairs, concluded “that each administration fights the problem it confronts.” If any administration is faced with serious inflation, or high unemployment, or any other serious problem, it really has no choice but to deal with it as best it can.

⁴¹ Bowman Cutter interview.

⁴² Leon Panetta interview.

DOMESTIC POLICY

The problem with domestic policy, according to Donald Rumsfeld, is that there are so many domestic departments that almost all issues are multi-departmental. Therefore you need a mechanism such as the Domestic Council “to sort and sift among the departments and agencies and assign jurisdiction and coordinate decisions so you don’t end up tripping over your shoelaces in dealing with the press, or with the Congress, or even have the left hand not know what the right hand is doing.”⁴³ Accordingly, the domestic staff’s constituency is a wide array of agencies, and beyond that the various population groups these agencies represent.

Whom did the Domestic Council staff members consult? “We had a couple of professors from major law schools,” recalled one Nixon staff member. “I mean it’s a process of trying to get the best minds that we could to look at the problem along the way. And even before that we had a long string of meetings. We’d bring down a group of five or six people, and spend an afternoon talking about the problem.”⁴⁴ A colleague of the same staff member spoke about contacts within the agencies and beyond.

Each of us has within his area certain antennae that operate. One is people in the agencies that... call [in with] early warning of problems that are upcoming as well as opportunities. And each one of us has three or four relatively influential people in the agencies that we contact on a regular basis, daily. Another one, and this is one that a lot of people miss; [is that] we talk to a fantastic range of people. When we’re out, maybe a speech in California, we’ll talk to educators pro and con, and there are a lot of ideas that get popped into the system that way.⁴⁵

Meetings are staples of domestic staff life. If anything, they become more exhaustive as one moves up the hierarchy. In early 1979, President Carter asked Stuart Eizenstat to head an interagency task force on energy legislation. Eizenstat “spent weeks of intensive meetings every night at five o’clock getting all the agencies together to see what the next wave of energy legislation might look like. We sat down with the agencies and talked it through. We asked them to staff it out and come back and let the other agencies see it.”⁴⁶ Fifteen to twenty persons, principally assistant secretaries and assistant administrators, attended. At the same time, Eizenstat and his colleagues were in constant touch with members of Congress, committee staffs, and representatives of trucking, rail, and airline industries. Major policy development is not done casually.

Finally, the President makes major decisions. In 1991, there was a question whether President Bush should sign or veto a civil rights bill. James Cicconi wrote a statement recommending that Bush sign the “not very good, but not horrible” bill. Counsel Boyden Gray wrote a statement strongly recommending a veto. “They were just diametrically opposed points of view,” Cicconi said. “I sent both statements to the President... I recommended that he read both. I told him what the differences were and why.” Bush read both, then called him saying he preferred Cicconi’s view.⁴⁷

Any policy proposal, Leon Panetta felt, should “be scrubbed the same way so that we know that numbers, what it costs, what’s going to happen, are defensible and we don’t blow up by just throwing an idea

⁴³ Donald Rumsfeld interview.

⁴⁴ Personal interview with John Kessel.

⁴⁵ Personal interview with John Kessel.

⁴⁶ Personal interview with John Kessel.

⁴⁷ James Cicconi interview.

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out there.”⁴⁸ The idea of Hope Scholarships came up during some campaign sessions, but President Clinton directed that it be subject to this type of review. After it was reviewed by the Department of Education and OMB, Bruce Reed of the Domestic Policy Council and Gene Sperling of the National Economic Council brought the results to Panetta. In his judgment, there were about three options. “We then took those issues, brought them to the President, went over it with him. He made the decision, and we then packaged it and had it ready for the speech.”⁴⁹

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

Virtually all White House interaction with the legal environment originates in the office of counsel to the President. Four aspects of the counsel’s position bring the office into contact with various legal institutions: chair of the war powers committee, chair of the judicial selection committee, acting as the White House conduit to the office of legal counsel, and as the principal defender of the President’s constitutional prerogatives.

When Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973, it was thought to be a check on the President’s ability to deploy troops overseas. In practice it has not proved to be so, but it is still legislation to which attention must be paid. In addition to the President’s counsel and the head of the office of legal counsel, the war powers committee included senior legal officers of the state and defense departments, the joint chiefs, the CIA, and the NSC. Meeting on an as needed basis, this committee would determine what had in fact happened in some overseas situation, and what action – often a notification – was needed so the White House could adapt to the events that had taken place.

The judicial selection committee is a group of White House and justice department officials who consider possible judicial appointees. The White House is most involved when there is a Supreme Court vacancy. Peter Wallison described decision-making when Antonin Scalia was chosen. President Reagan wished to consider only sitting federal judges. Two lawyers in the counsel’s office and several in the justice department read the opinions of appeals court judges, and then wrote memoranda describing the judges’ philosophies. In this particular instance President Reagan was more taken by the chance to appoint the first Italian American justice than by any philosophical nuances, but Robert Bork and Anthony Kennedy, both of whom were subsequently nominated for the Supreme Court, were among the judges analyzed.

The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel drafts the legal opinions of the attorney general, and provides opinions for all governmental agencies. With respect to the President, OLC responds to requests for legal opinions or oral advice from the President’s counsel, and reviews all executive orders and proclamations for form and legality. In adapting to each other, the relationship between the counsel’s office and OLC can be mutually supportive or somewhat contentious. If the President’s counsel makes a request, this may alert OLC to developments inside the White House. Their opinion, in turn, may strengthen the counsel’s hand inside the White House, as they provide an external statement (as opposed to the counsel’s own view) that the President is constrained by statutes to act in such-and-such a way. The President’s counsel, however, might be a rival to OLC if government agencies take a question to the White House rather than to OLC. In any case, the counsel’s office and OLC keep each other busy.

⁴⁸ Leon Panetta interview.

⁴⁹ Leon Panetta interview.

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Yet another responsibility is to serve as custodian of the rights and responsibilities of the office of the presidency. The lawyer's understanding of the durability of precedent makes the counsel reluctant to agree to any diminution of power that would handicap a future President. Consequently, A.B. Culvahouse (who succeeded Wallison as counsel during Reagan's second term) explained, "you're the last and in some cases the only protector of the President's constitutional privileges. Almost everyone else is willing to give those away in part inch by inch and bit by bit in order to win the issue of the day, to achieve compromise on today's thorny issue."⁵⁰ The counsel tries to guard against any erosion of presidential authority.

Each of the counsel's activities deals with the law in some respect. But since the entire White House must consider both policy and politics, the counsel is invariably surrounded by a blend of law, policy, and politics.

INTERPRETING INCOMING INFORMATION

The contact between the White House staff and the political environment generates a lot of information. Since the information comes from different segments of the environment, each of which has a language and a culture of its own, it needs to be interpreted as it ascends to the upper levels of the White House. Talented as the senior staffers may be, it would be unusual for the same person to understand a foreign intelligence report about Afghanistan, a monetary analysis from the Federal Reserve Board, the interpersonal chemistry between members of a Senate committee, and so on. All these bits of information have meaning, but someone must place them in context by providing related intelligence so the implications can be understood.

In dealing with the media, for example, Howard Baker said, "Marlin [Fitzwater] was indispensable. Marlin almost every day would tell us what the lead was going to be that night on the 6:30 news. Tom Griscom (a Baker aide who served as communications director) did that too. It was invaluable to be able to know even hours in advance what was likely to confront us in the papers or on television."⁵¹

On breaking news, there is also a tie between the media and those responsible for policy. Pete Roussel told of a midnight phone call from Deborah Potter, then with CBS News. "She said, 'Pete, we've just had a report that 250 marines have just been killed in Lebanon. Do you know anything about that?'"⁵² When you get a call from a good reporter like that, you usually perk up." In this case, Roussel had barely put the phone down when he got a call from national security assistant Bud McFarlane telling him of an incident in Lebanon. "Bud," Roussel replied, "CBS just called me about it. They're already on to it."⁵³

When domestic proposals would come in, they would need to be routed to other agencies to determine how they affected those agencies' plans. Phillip Brady (who served as staff secretary in the Bush administration), said that when he got a request to get something on the President's desk as quickly as possible, he "would take it to [cabinet secretary] Edie Holliday, the cabinet secretary, and say, 'you take care of the external vetting [outside of the White House complex] and then I'll take care of the internal vetting.'"⁵⁴

⁵⁰ White House Interview Program, Interview with A.B. Culvahouse, Martha Joynt Kumar, Washington, D.C., September 15, 1999.

⁵¹ Howard Baker interview.

⁵² Peter Roussel interview.

⁵³ Peter Roussel interview.

⁵⁴ White House Interview Program, Interview with Phillip Brady, Martha Joynt Kumar, McLean, VA., August 17, 1999.

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If it were an educational issue, it might be sent to the education office in the department of labor, or to the justice department to determine if the federal government had authority to take the proposed actions. "Internal vetting," Brady continued, "meant going to the office of policy development, or perhaps OMB [which had a section devoted to educational issues]."⁵⁵

Howard Baker acknowledged that at first he did not understand many of the technical terms contained in reports he was receiving from OMB. He sought help from Dan Cripman who had been his economic adviser when Baker was Senate majority leader. "You have to come down here and... be my interpreter," Baker implored. "You've got to tell me what this means."⁵⁶ With Cripman's help, he reached a necessary threshold of understanding, and thereafter was able to deal with OMB without difficulty.

COORDINATION

A final point. Given a segmented White House staff, how can the media relations, the congressional relations, the legal work, and the relevant policy activities be focused so the actions of each unit reinforce the actions of other units? A number of coordinating routines have been developed, the most important of which is a series of morning meetings. All six administrations have held morning meetings, and those in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations have been quite similar in form.

One is a large senior staff meeting including all the assistants to the President t. This is an informational meeting. The heads of all the units report what their unit is doing. More importantly, the Chief of Staff announces decisions that have been made, and tells everyone what is to be emphasized in the immediate future. As Leon Panetta explained, this meeting gives him a chance "to let the larger staff know what's happening with the President t what are the major issues so... they didn't feel like they were out of the loop as far as the process was concerned."⁵⁷

The second session, sometimes held before and sometimes after the large meeting just discussed, is often called the "real meeting." The attendance here is limited to about half a dozen: the Chief of Staff and the core members of the senior staff. This is a decision-making meeting in which the pros and cons of proceeding one way or the other are frankly discussed.

After the "large meeting," and the "real meeting," each of the unit heads would hold a meeting with their own staffs, the Press Secretary with the press staff, and so forth. The unit heads would pass along decisions that had been made or announced at the earlier meetings, and then would discuss what the individual unit was going to be doing. It is this sequence -- an exchange of information in the senior staff meetings followed by sharing the information with each individual staff -- that produces close coordination of the several staff units.

At the same time the unit heads are meeting with their own staffs, the Chief of Staff meets with the President t. He briefs the President t on what has been discussed at the preceding meetings plus any other matters he wants to call to the chief executive's attention. In turn the President t instructs the Chief of Staff

⁵⁵ Phillip Brady interview.

⁵⁶ Howard Baker interview.

⁵⁷ Leon Panetta interview.

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what he wants to have done, and what issues he wants to have emphasized. That meeting, in Howard Baker's words, is "really the focal point of the administration."⁵⁸

There must be routine senior staff meetings, Bowman Cutter argued, because "the real functions, the administration of the White House, the President's calendar, the congressional relations, the press relations, the political constituency relations do all pretty much work better when they are knitted together."⁵⁹ Richard Cheney used virtually the same metaphor. As a result of the meetings, "you'd get everybody sort of stitched together."⁶⁰ So we end as we began. Regardless of whether they are Democrats or Republicans, thoughtful White House veterans are in fundamental agreement on how the presidential staff should serve their President and their country.

LESSONS LEARNED

The White House staff carries out many activities that are crucial to any administration's success. The work of scores of presidential assistants must be coordinated. Administration proposals must be shepherded on Capitol Hill. Reporters seeking stories must be provided with information. Foreign policies must be devised. Budgets must be shaped, and economic priorities must be sorted out. The missions of the domestic agencies must be satisfactory to the electorate. All of these tasks – and many others besides -- must be done within the limits of the law.

If this work by the White House staff is to be effective, certain lessons should be borne in mind.

- Staff members must discover how the President likes to work, and adapt their routines to his work style.
- Successful adaptation means adjusting procedures in order to maximize the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of a given incumbent.
- Staff members must have the President's trust.
- At least some staff members must be willing to speak to the President with absolute candor, and deal with topics the President would prefer to avoid.
- In order to maximize the foregoing conditions, some staff members should have developed a personal relationship with the President over a long period of time.
- Each major staff unit deals with important external institutions: Congress, the press, foreign governments, business and financial institutions, domestic agencies, and the Courts and legal institutions.
- These staff units are skill positions. The unit heads and as many staff members as possible must be professionals who know the issues and individuals with which they will deal.
- When an unqualified person is placed in one of these skill positions, the result is poor relationships with Congress, foreign policy mistakes, bad economic advice given to the President, and so forth. In each case, the policy cost to the nation and the political cost to the administration are quite high.

⁵⁸ Howard Baker interview.

⁵⁹ Bowman Cutter interview.

⁶⁰ Richard Cheney interview.

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- The President and at least some of the senior White House aides are politicians, specialists in building support behind policies. Therefore there must be some means of “translating” the information that comes from policy experts into language that a generalist can understand. Otherwise, the President will not understand the implications of decisions he must make.
- Since the major White House units have a variety of specializations, there must be some way of coordinating their efforts so that policies, legislative strategies, and media campaigns are coordinated. One means of doing this is a series of senior staff meetings that take place every morning.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

After receiving his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1958, John H. Kessel taught at Amherst and Mount Holyoke colleges and the University of Washington. He became Arthur E. Braun Professor of Political Science at Allegheny College in 1965. From 1970 to 1994, he was Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, and has been Professor Emeritus since that time.

Professor Kessel's books include *The Goldwater Coalition* (1968), *The Domestic Presidency* (1975), *Presidential Campaign Politics* (1980), *Presidential Parties* (1984), and *Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment* (2001). He has been a member of the council of the American Political Science Association, editor of the *American Journal of Political Science*, and President of the Midwest Political Science Association.

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ABOUT THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT

<http://whitehouse2001.org>

Presidency scholars lead a two-part project designed to provide incoming White House staff members with information on operating key White House offices and to help presidential nominees fill out the tidal wave of forms they face in the appointments process. Funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts, a foundation known for the stature of its programs and the nonpartisan nature of its organization, the White House 2001 Project works with two broad, Pew initiatives: The Transition to Governing Project of the American Enterprise Institute and the Presidential Appointee Initiative of the Brookings Institution. White House 2001 was designed and developed by the board and members of the Presidency Research Group, the worldwide professional organization of scholars focused on the American presidency and a section of the American Political Science Association.

THE WHITE HOUSE INTERVIEW PROGRAM

Unlike corporations both large and small, a White House begins without a record compiled by its previous occupants. The goal of the White House Interview Program is to smooth the path to power by furnishing incoming staff with substantive information about the operation of seven White House offices critical to an effective beginning: Chief of Staff, Staff Secretary, Press Office, Office of Communications, Office of the Counsel to the President, Office of Management and Administration, and the Office of Presidential Personnel. Through interviews with current and former White House staff members from the last six administrations, the White House Interview Program provides new staff with detailed information about how their White House offices function, the organization of their units, and the roles played by the heads of each office.

In addition to this institutional memory, the White House Interview Program provides a support package of important tools previous staff have identified as invaluable. These tools include a “rolodex” of contact information about the people who previously served in their posts with current addresses and phone numbers. The White House Interview Program also provides the first ever detailed organization charts of White House offices approximately every six months through the Carter administration. The scholars associated with the project, researching and writing about the White House staff, are nationally recognized for their work on the presidency. They are: Professors Peri Arnold, MaryAnne Borrelli, John Burke, George Edwards, Karen Hult, Nancy Kassop, John Kessel, Martha Joynt Kumar, Bradley Patterson, James Pfiffner, Terry Sullivan, Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, Charles Walcott, Shirley Anne Warshaw, and Stephen Wayne.

NOMINATION FORMS ONLINE

In order to address the volume of information required from appointees and the problem of the plethora of forms to be filled out by nominees, the *Nomination Forms Online* program provides a software package that nominees can use to complete the myriad of forms required by the White House, the FBI, the US Office of Government Ethics, and, where appropriate, the Senate committee of jurisdiction. The software uses innovative programming techniques so that the software distributes repetitive information across the several forms nominees must complete. The software allows the nominee to store information for future use in completing annual reports. It also makes available a portable file of data in standard formats so the nominee can share information, at his or her discretion, with the White House Office of Presidential Personnel and other agencies. Nomination Forms Online is freeware.

THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT REPORT SERIES

available in PDF format (as noted) from: <http://whitehouse2001.org>

GENERAL SERIES

This collection of reports from the White House 2001 Project describe topics of general concern to White House operations. Those in the general series marked with an asterisk (*) are currently only available to the Presidential Transition Team.

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| 1. Opportunities and Hazards – The White House Interview Program | 6. The White House World – Start Up, Organization, and the Pressures of Work Life* |
| 2. Meeting the Freight Train Head On – Planning for the Presidential Transition | 7. A Guide to Inquiry* |
| 3. Lessons from Past Transitions | 8. Analyzing Questionnaires – Executive Forms for Nominees* |
| 4. A Tale of Two Transitions: 1980 and 1988 | |
| 5. The Presidency and the Political Environment* | |

WHITE HOUSE STAFF SERIES

This collection of reports from the White House 2001 Project create an “institutional memory” for the White House Staff. Currently, these reports are available only to the Presidential Transition Team. Look for a release of these reports in the Spring of 2001.

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| 21. Office of the Chief of Staff | 32. Organization Charts for the Press Office |
| 22. Organization Charts for the Office of Chief of Staff | 33. Office of Communications |
| 23. Office of the Staff Secretary | 34. Organization Charts for the Office of Communications |
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